Long story short, afew years ago i spent abit 6000 NZD on dogecoin. Ive made poor trading decisions with it since then and its now worth about 1500 NZD. I understand its extremely unlikely ill ever see that money again.
Ive got it in an online wallet. What would you do if you were in my position? Should i just cut my losses, keep it in doge or pivot to another or several other coins?
I know im an idiot, please dont remind me. I wouldn’t make these kinds of choices if had the chance to run it again
Thank you for reading
Hi everyone
Im hoping to ask for some advice.
Long story short, afew years ago i spent abit 6000 NZD on dogecoin. Ive made poor trading decisions with it since then and its now worth about 1500 NZD. I understand its extremely unlikely ill ever see that money again.
Ive got it in an online wallet. What would you do if you were in my position? Should i just cut my losses, keep it in doge or pivot to another or several other coins?
I know im an idiot, please dont remind me. I wouldn’t make these kinds of choices if had the chance to run it again
There are a few nuances to my approach, but the key detail is that I wanted it to also work in a browser so I needed the ability to build to a wasm to be used in js.
Signal libraries don’t offer browser based capabilities and so I created this to target web aswell as native.
I wanted to implement the Signal protocol for a series of secure messaging apps I’m working on, so I built this project to test and use in my own work. It’s still far from finished, but I think it’s at a stage where it’s worth sharing with the community.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: This project is not professionally audited and is not production-ready. I do not recommend anyone use this in their own code yet. It is provided strictly for testing, experimentation, and demo purposes. I used AI as an assistant to help build this, so double-check everything before taking it seriously.
Spec Alignment: The goal is to fully align with the official Signal protocol spec.
Testing: It includes unit tests, but due to WASM testing limitations, I also added a Storybook-like UI to run and test it directly within a browser environment.
The impementation here is being used in a few experimental messaging apps (similarly unaudited and unreviewed):
I am also working towards adding it to an open source project soon as seen at: github.com/positive-intentions/chat for e2e open-source transparency in the implementation.
There are a few nuances to my approach, but the key detail is that I wanted it to also work in a browser so I needed the ability to build to a wasm to be used in js.
Signal libraries don’t offer browser based capabilities and so I created this to target web aswell as native.
I wanted to implement the Signal protocol for a series of secure messaging apps I’m working on, so I built this project to test and use in my own work. It’s still far from finished, but I think it’s at a stage where it’s worth sharing with the community.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: This project is not professionally audited and is not production-ready. I do not recommend anyone use this in their own code yet. It is provided strictly for testing, experimentation, and demo purposes. I used AI as an assistant to help build this, so double-check everything before taking it seriously.
Spec Alignment: The goal is to fully align with the official Signal protocol spec.
Testing: It includes unit tests, but due to WASM testing limitations, I also added a Storybook-like UI to run and test it directly within a browser environment.
The impementation here is being used in a few experimental messaging apps (similarly unaudited and unreviewed):
I am also working towards adding it to an open source project soon as seen at: github.com/positive-intentions/chat for e2e open-source transparency in the implementation.
The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates have been compromised. They chain to roots trusted by the Mozilla, Microsoft, Apple and Chrome root programs and by many downstream trust stores.
In addition to the test on the linked site, vulnerability can also be checked using this link, which either returns “oh no” (vulnerable client) or a revoked certificate error (not vulnerable): bgptools.emsign.filippo.io/generate_200
The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates have been compromised. They chain to roots trusted by the Mozilla, Microsoft, Apple and Chrome root programs and by many downstream trust stores.
In addition to the test on the linked site, vulnerability can also be checked using this link, which either returns “oh no” (vulnerable client) or a revoked certificate error (not vulnerable): bgptools.emsign.filippo.io/generate_200
I’m looking for feedback on age-rt, an experimental streaming format based on age v1.
The motivation is to use age-style encryption for data that is produced continuously and should be forwarded immediately, such as live audio/video, terminal output, telemetry, logs, event feeds, and long-running network connections.
Age’s fixed-size payload chunks work well for files, but can introduce latency when data arrives slowly or in small pieces. age-rt aims to retain age’s encryption and key-management model while allowing available data to be encrypted and transmitted immediately. The proposal is intentionally a minimal diff to the original spec with conservative settings, so that security analysis is straightforward and existing age implementations can be reused.
The main differences from age v1 are:
variable-sized chunks, from 0 to 65,536 bytes (no padding required to fill a fixed-size chunk)
an explicit 4-byte ciphertext length before each chunk
custom header string (same format)
The specification is separate from the implementation. It documents the resulting metadata leakage, including chunk sizes and timing. The design is experimental and has not been independently audited.
I’d welcome general discussion, criticism, and concrete attack scenarios, particularly regarding the framing, security properties, and practical usefulness for real-time streams.
I’m looking for feedback on age-rt, an experimental streaming format based on age v1.
The motivation is to use age-style encryption for data that is produced continuously and should be forwarded immediately, such as live audio/video, terminal output, telemetry, logs, event feeds, and long-running network connections.
Age’s fixed-size payload chunks work well for files, but can introduce latency when data arrives slowly or in small pieces. age-rt aims to retain age’s encryption and key-management model while allowing available data to be encrypted and transmitted immediately. The proposal is intentionally a minimal diff to the original spec with conservative settings, so that security analysis is straightforward and existing age implementations can be reused.
The main differences from age v1 are:
variable-sized chunks, from 0 to 65,536 bytes (no padding required to fill a fixed-size chunk)
an explicit 4-byte ciphertext length before each chunk
custom header string (same format)
The specification is separate from the implementation. It documents the resulting metadata leakage, including chunk sizes and timing. The design is experimental and has not been independently audited.
I’d welcome general discussion, criticism, and concrete attack scenarios, particularly regarding the framing, security properties, and practical usefulness for real-time streams.
“Democracy has been hailed as, like, the holy grail for the last couple hundred years, but democracies are inefficient,” said the crypto billionaire. “If you get a benevolent dictator, it’s actually extremely efficient.”
“Democracy has been hailed as, like, the holy grail for the last couple hundred years, but democracies are inefficient,” said the crypto billionaire. “If you get a benevolent dictator, it’s actually extremely efficient.”
Hello,
i have a question. I understand that government institutions probably do not want to certify memoryhard KDFs like argon* (because government agencies cannot bruteforce for clandestine or forensic purporses) but sometimes i wonder, if there is actual mathematical proof, that memory hardness like done for argon, scrypt and co. cannot be reverse into more bruteforce with a timetradeoff.
Can anyone explain this to me, because i feel like i do not understand something?
Hello,
i have a question. I understand that government institutions probably do not want to certify memoryhard KDFs like argon* (because government agencies cannot bruteforce for clandestine or forensic purporses) but sometimes i wonder, if there is actual mathematical proof, that memory hardness like done for argon, scrypt and co. cannot be reverse into more bruteforce with a timetradeoff.
Can anyone explain this to me, because i feel like i do not understand something?
Claim being tested: the Q‑Day Prize submission in this repo demonstrates a quantum attack on ECDLP — specifically, key recovery on curves up to 17 bits using IBM Quantum hardware.
This branch applies a single surgical patch (−29 / +30 lines) to projecteleven.py. The patch replaces the IBM Quantum backend inside solve_ecdlp() with os.urandom. Everything else — circuit construction, the ripple‑carry oracle, the extraction pipeline, the d·G == Q verifier — runs byte‑for‑byte unchanged.
If the quantum computer were contributing measurable signal, this substitution should break the recoveries. It does not. The author’s own CLI recovers every reported private key at statistically indistinguishable rates from the IBM hardware runs.
[…]
The 17‑bit result is the one awarded 1 BTC. /dev/urandom recovers it ~40% of runs on a laptop. The author ran it once on IBM ibm_fez and claimed a quantum result.
Claim being tested: the Q‑Day Prize submission in this repo demonstrates a quantum attack on ECDLP — specifically, key recovery on curves up to 17 bits using IBM Quantum hardware.
This branch applies a single surgical patch (−29 / +30 lines) to projecteleven.py. The patch replaces the IBM Quantum backend inside solve_ecdlp() with os.urandom. Everything else — circuit construction, the ripple‑carry oracle, the extraction pipeline, the d·G == Q verifier — runs byte‑for‑byte unchanged.
If the quantum computer were contributing measurable signal, this substitution should break the recoveries. It does not. The author’s own CLI recovers every reported private key at statistically indistinguishable rates from the IBM hardware runs.
[…]
The 17‑bit result is the one awarded 1 BTC. /dev/urandom recovers it ~40% of runs on a laptop. The author ran it once on IBM ibm_fez and claimed a quantum result.
Include Mozilla’s CRLite and daily updates for both and suddenly we have high performance high security certificate validation which includes revocation checking and duplicate certificate discoverability (MITM risk) from the transparency logs
Include Mozilla’s CRLite and daily updates for both and suddenly we have high performance high security certificate validation which includes revocation checking and duplicate certificate discoverability (MITM risk) from the transparency logs
Your computer is likely generating random noise on your sound card. On some systems you can harvest this noise as true random entropy. This entropy can be diffused and whitened for use in cryptography.
Your computer is likely generating random noise on your sound card. On some systems you can harvest this noise as true random entropy. This entropy can be diffused and whitened for use in cryptography.
Al Gore Invented the Internet. Joe Biden invented PGP encryption. Cypherpunks write code.
Joe Biden gifted humanity with PGP encryption (in a roundabout way). Phil Zimmermann created PGP in response to a anti-privacy bill clause proposed by Senator Joe Biden.
“In 1990, the FBI launched an over-the-top crackdown on computer hackers, known as Operation Sundevil. This was swiftly followed, in early 1991, by a proposed piece of U.S. Senate legislation that would force electronic communications service providers to hand over people’s personal data. (The key clause, S.266, was pushed by the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joe Biden.)”
“On learning of Biden’s S.266 clause, Zimmermann feverishly set out to complete the project, almost losing his house in the process. When he finished his software in 1991, he published it all online, free for anyone who wanted to use it. He called it “Pretty Good Privacy,” or PGP for short, and within weeks it had been downloaded and shared by thousands of people around the world. “Before PGP, there was no way for two ordinary people to communicate over long distances without the risk of interception,” said Zimmermann in a later interview. “Not by phone, not by FedEx, not by fax.” It remains the most widely used form of email encryption to this day.”
“SEC. 2201. COOPERATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT. It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law.”
Al Gore Invented the Internet. Joe Biden invented PGP encryption. Cypherpunks write code.
Joe Biden gifted humanity with PGP encryption (in a roundabout way). Phil Zimmermann created PGP in response to a anti-privacy bill clause proposed by Senator Joe Biden.
“In 1990, the FBI launched an over-the-top crackdown on computer hackers, known as Operation Sundevil. This was swiftly followed, in early 1991, by a proposed piece of U.S. Senate legislation that would force electronic communications service providers to hand over people’s personal data. (The key clause, S.266, was pushed by the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joe Biden.)”
“On learning of Biden’s S.266 clause, Zimmermann feverishly set out to complete the project, almost losing his house in the process. When he finished his software in 1991, he published it all online, free for anyone who wanted to use it. He called it “Pretty Good Privacy,” or PGP for short, and within weeks it had been downloaded and shared by thousands of people around the world. “Before PGP, there was no way for two ordinary people to communicate over long distances without the risk of interception,” said Zimmermann in a later interview. “Not by phone, not by FedEx, not by fax.” It remains the most widely used form of email encryption to this day.”
“SEC. 2201. COOPERATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT. It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law.”
In this paper, we undertake a structured security analysis of Wi-Fi client isolation and uncover new classes of attacks that bypass this protection. We identify several root causes behind these weaknesses. First, Wi-Fi keys that protect broadcast frames are improperly managed and can be abused to bypass client isolation. Second, isolation is often only enforced at the MAC or IP layer, but not both. Third, weak synchronization of a client’s identity across the network stack allows one to bypass Wi-Fi client isolation at the network layer instead, enabling the interception of uplink and downlink traffic of other clients as well as internal backend devices. Every tested router and network was vulnerable to at least one attack. More broadly, the lack of standardization leads to inconsistent, ad hoc, and often incomplete implementations of isolation across vendors.
In this paper, we undertake a structured security analysis of Wi-Fi client isolation and uncover new classes of attacks that bypass this protection. We identify several root causes behind these weaknesses. First, Wi-Fi keys that protect broadcast frames are improperly managed and can be abused to bypass client isolation. Second, isolation is often only enforced at the MAC or IP layer, but not both. Third, weak synchronization of a client’s identity across the network stack allows one to bypass Wi-Fi client isolation at the network layer instead, enabling the interception of uplink and downlink traffic of other clients as well as internal backend devices. Every tested router and network was vulnerable to at least one attack. More broadly, the lack of standardization leads to inconsistent, ad hoc, and often incomplete implementations of isolation across vendors.
A pangram is a sentence or phrase that contains each letter of an alphabet or character set at least once. A perfect pangram is an anagram of the alphabet which contains each letter exactly once.
Pangram hash generates a perfect pangram hash digest consisting of a anagram permutation of a character set. Each character in the output is unique and non-repeating.
A pangram is a sentence or phrase that contains each letter of an alphabet or character set at least once. A perfect pangram is an anagram of the alphabet which contains each letter exactly once.
Pangram hash generates a perfect pangram hash digest consisting of a anagram permutation of a character set. Each character in the output is unique and non-repeating.
Paul Kehrer and Alex Gaynor, maintainers of the Python cryptography module, have put out some strongly worded criticism of OpenSSL. It comes from a talk they gave at the OpenSSL conference in October 2025 (YouTube video). The post goes into a lot of detail about the problems with the OpenSSL code base and testing, which has led the cryptography team to reconsider using the library. “The mistakes we see in OpenSSL’s development have become so significant that we believe substantial changes are required — either to OpenSSL, or to our reliance on it.” They go further in the conclusion:
First, we will no longer require OpenSSL implementations for new functionality. Where we deem it desirable, we will add new APIs that are only on LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC. Concretely, we expect to add ML-KEM and ML-DSA APIs that are only available with LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC, and not with OpenSSL.
Second, we currently statically link a copy of OpenSSL in our wheels (binary artifacts). We are beginning the process of looking into what would be required to change our wheels to link against one of the OpenSSL forks.
If we are able to successfully switch to one of OpenSSL’s forks for our binary wheels, we will begin considering the circumstances under which we would drop support for OpenSSL entirely.
Paul Kehrer and Alex Gaynor, maintainers of the Python cryptography module, have put out some strongly worded criticism of OpenSSL. It comes from a talk they gave at the OpenSSL conference in October 2025 (YouTube video). The post goes into a lot of detail about the problems with the OpenSSL code base and testing, which has led the cryptography team to reconsider using the library. “The mistakes we see in OpenSSL’s development have become so significant that we believe substantial changes are required — either to OpenSSL, or to our reliance on it.” They go further in the conclusion:
First, we will no longer require OpenSSL implementations for new functionality. Where we deem it desirable, we will add new APIs that are only on LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC. Concretely, we expect to add ML-KEM and ML-DSA APIs that are only available with LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC, and not with OpenSSL.
Second, we currently statically link a copy of OpenSSL in our wheels (binary artifacts). We are beginning the process of looking into what would be required to change our wheels to link against one of the OpenSSL forks.
If we are able to successfully switch to one of OpenSSL’s forks for our binary wheels, we will begin considering the circumstances under which we would drop support for OpenSSL entirely.
We show that a simple eavesdropper listening in on classical communication between potentially entangled quantum parties will eventually be able to impersonate any of the parties. Furthermore, the attack is efficient if one-way puzzles do not exist. As a direct consequence, one-way puzzles are implied by reusable authentication schemes over classical channels with quantum pre-shared secrets that are potentially evolving.
As an additional application, we show that any quantum money scheme that can be verified through only classical queries to any oracle cannot be information-theoretically secure. This significantly generalizes the prior work by Ananth, Hu, and Yuen (ASIACRYPT’23) where they showed the same but only for the specific case of random oracles. Therefore, verifying black-box constructions of quantum money inherently requires coherently evaluating the underlying cryptographic tools, which may be difficult for near-term quantum devices.
Abstract
We show that a simple eavesdropper listening in on classical communication between potentially entangled quantum parties will eventually be able to impersonate any of the parties. Furthermore, the attack is efficient if one-way puzzles do not exist. As a direct consequence, one-way puzzles are implied by reusable authentication schemes over classical channels with quantum pre-shared secrets that are potentially evolving.
As an additional application, we show that any quantum money scheme that can be verified through only classical queries to any oracle cannot be information-theoretically secure. This significantly generalizes the prior work by Ananth, Hu, and Yuen (ASIACRYPT’23) where they showed the same but only for the specific case of random oracles. Therefore, verifying black-box constructions of quantum money inherently requires coherently evaluating the underlying cryptographic tools, which may be difficult for near-term quantum devices.