#cybersecurity

posts tagged #cybersecurity

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[EURid registry] Is a 6 character lowercase alphanumeric password (31b entropy) which randomly changes every 2 hours safe enough for online service (possibly) without proper rate limiting?

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I’ve recently registered a .eu domain name.

EURid registry has a portal where you can generate a transfer code, thus not fully relying on access to registrar (as well as check and verify your info).

Welp, security.

The only security is a code sent to e-mail associated with the domain. While the portal requires entering this address to log in, it can also be pulled from WHOIS where it is mandatorily published.
Regardless, e-mail (as a string) should not be affecting security.

The code, as I mentioned, is just lowercase letters and numbers. Precisely 6 of them. This is valid for 2 hours and one use.
While there is a “Request new code” button, I wasn’t able to generate multiple codes for one 2 hour window, so that’s good.

But now we get to rate-limiting. After 9 attempts, I get:

You have exceeded the allowed number of requests.
Please try again in 10 minutes.

Sounds good, BUT, clearing cookies bypasses this.
I have not (yet) tried any automation, I just quickly manually repeated this tomfoolery from same IP 3 times without actually being rate-limited.


I find this… at least strange. Especially since everyone is doing at least 2FA, while some sites even support physical security keys, and then there’s “we email you 6 characters”.

I’ve recently registered a .eu domain name.

EURid registry has a portal where you can generate a transfer code, thus not fully relying on access to registrar (as well as check and verify your info).

Welp, security.

The only security is a code sent to e-mail associated with the domain. While the portal requires entering this address to log in, it can also be pulled from WHOIS where it is mandatorily published.
Regardless, e-mail (as a string) should not be affecting security.

The code, as I mentioned, is just lowercase letters and numbers. Precisely 6 of them. This is valid for 2 hours and one use.
While there is a “Request new code” button, I wasn’t able to generate multiple codes for one 2 hour window, so that’s good.

But now we get to rate-limiting. After 9 attempts, I get:

You have exceeded the allowed number of requests.
Please try again in 10 minutes.

Sounds good, BUT, clearing cookies bypasses this.
I have not (yet) tried any automation, I just quickly manually repeated this tomfoolery from same IP 3 times without actually being rate-limited.


I find this… at least strange. Especially since everyone is doing at least 2FA, while some sites even support physical security keys, and then there’s “we email you 6 characters”.

0

Cybersecurity is also about protecting rights

Association for Progressive Communications Cybersecurity is also about protecting rights www.apc.org
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Digital security also requires resources and ongoing support. As the Internet Society noted, the organisations on the front lines fighting for a safer internet need funding to sustain their work. Without that support, many protection initiatives are forced to rely on isolated efforts and on capacities that are not always available.

However, the responsibility does not lie with organisations alone. Platforms must offer effective mechanisms for reporting and addressing abuses, without giving up point-to-point encryption protection. States, for their part, have the obligation to protect people’s rights in the digital sphere. This entails enhancing privacy and security guarantees, not demanding backdoors or other ways of bypassing encryption, as well as preventing cybersecurity policies from becoming an excuse to expand surveillance or to persecute those working for a safer internet.

The Ola Bini case shows that the latter risk is not hypothetical. In early October, Ecuador deported the digital security expert after revoking his visa because the government claimed he posed a threat to national security, while a habeas corpus action was still pending.

Digital security also requires resources and ongoing support. As the Internet Society noted, the organisations on the front lines fighting for a safer internet need funding to sustain their work. Without that support, many protection initiatives are forced to rely on isolated efforts and on capacities that are not always available.

However, the responsibility does not lie with organisations alone. Platforms must offer effective mechanisms for reporting and addressing abuses, without giving up point-to-point encryption protection. States, for their part, have the obligation to protect people’s rights in the digital sphere. This entails enhancing privacy and security guarantees, not demanding backdoors or other ways of bypassing encryption, as well as preventing cybersecurity policies from becoming an excuse to expand surveillance or to persecute those working for a safer internet.

The Ola Bini case shows that the latter risk is not hypothetical. In early October, Ecuador deported the digital security expert after revoking his visa because the government claimed he posed a threat to national security, while a habeas corpus action was still pending.

88

There isn't an easy exploit for this PHP vulnerability

Elias Taylor There isn't an easy exploit for this PHP vulnerability eliastaylor.com
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I came across the link via https://mastodon.social/@CuratedHackerNews/117481600704689796

Last time I touched php it was ~20 years ago and maybe for a month. Could someone with actual php understanding weigh in?

Somehow, somewhere between the lines, my understanding was that there have been observances of the vuln being used in the wild before the 14 UTC. And that wasn’t from reading news sites

I came across the link via https://mastodon.social/@CuratedHackerNews/117481600704689796

Last time I touched php it was ~20 years ago and maybe for a month. Could someone with actual php understanding weigh in?

Somehow, somewhere between the lines, my understanding was that there have been observances of the vuln being used in the wild before the 14 UTC. And that wasn’t from reading news sites

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PHP (RCE) Cyber Security Meltdown (21 Oct '26)

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CVE-2026-109618 CVE-2026-109618

x.com/NSACyber/status/2112903220209098897

x.com/Sad_HAMs_/status/2112879897572180387

Node.js

>Not just PHP. Node.js has also announced security releases for October 21, with HIGH-severity vulnerabilities affecting its 26.x, 24.x and 22.x release lines. > >If you run either stack in production, keep an eye on official advisories and apply patches promptly. > >Security maintenance doesn’t stop at your application code. Your runtime matters too.

x.com/itsMikeKipruto/status/2112846839720341572

CVE-2026-109618 CVE-2026-109618

x.com/NSACyber/status/2112903220209098897

x.com/Sad_HAMs_/status/2112879897572180387

Node.js

>Not just PHP. Node.js has also announced security releases for October 21, with HIGH-severity vulnerabilities affecting its 26.x, 24.x and 22.x release lines. > >If you run either stack in production, keep an eye on official advisories and apply patches promptly. > >Security maintenance doesn’t stop at your application code. Your runtime matters too.

x.com/itsMikeKipruto/status/2112846839720341572

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What are You Working on Wednesday

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Weekly thread to discuss whatever you’re working on, big or small, at work or in your free time.

But let me guess… something TLS cert or PHP-related? 😆😭

Weekly thread to discuss whatever you’re working on, big or small, at work or in your free time.

But let me guess… something TLS cert or PHP-related? 😆😭

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PHP: Security advisory: Critical remote code execution vulnerabilities, update now

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PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately.

Who is at risk: all PHP installations serving web requests, including PHP-FPM, Apache with mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. We consider the risk highest for mod_php, with a demonstrated exploit where an unauthenticated request can trigger the attack before any application code runs.

The vulnerabilities:

  • RCE via OOM corruption, CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w): out-of-memory handling can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized. Request cleanup may then treat the invalid data as valid.
  • RCE via stale global state, CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp): request-owned internal state can survive after its backing memory has been freed. A later request handled by the same worker may use that stale state before normal initialization resets it.

PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately.

Who is at risk: all PHP installations serving web requests, including PHP-FPM, Apache with mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. We consider the risk highest for mod_php, with a demonstrated exploit where an unauthenticated request can trigger the attack before any application code runs.

The vulnerabilities:

  • RCE via OOM corruption, CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w): out-of-memory handling can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized. Request cleanup may then treat the invalid data as valid.
  • RCE via stale global state, CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp): request-owned internal state can survive after its backing memory has been freed. A later request handled by the same worker may use that stale state before normal initialization resets it.
0

The Internet goes on high alert after discovery of 8 compromised TLS certs

Ars Technica The Internet goes on high alert after discovery of 8 compromised TLS certs arstechnica.com
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The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

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My Snowflake proxy just got ~11x its usual traffic in 24h. Anyone else seeing this?

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Hey ! Running a Snowflake proxy in Brave for a while now. Normally I help around 20 people on a busy day. Today the counter says 226 in the last 24h. Never seen anything close to that.

Is anyone else running a proxy and seeing a jump? Any tips on how to tell a real event from a local fluke?

Cheers

Hey ! Running a Snowflake proxy in Brave for a while now. Normally I help around 20 people on a busy day. Today the counter says 226 in the last 24h. Never seen anything close to that.

Is anyone else running a proxy and seeing a jump? Any tips on how to tell a real event from a local fluke?

Cheers

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Hackers obtain counterfeit TLS certificates for Google and other large services

Ars Technica Hackers obtain counterfeit TLS certificates for Google and other large services arstechnica.com
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Compromise of 3 domain registries allows hackers to walk off with unauthorized certs.

Compromise of 3 domain registries allows hackers to walk off with unauthorized certs.