0

Hong Kong rolls out AI facial recognition across CCTV network

CNA Hong Kong rolls out AI facial recognition across CCTV network www.channelnewsasia.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981796

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981495

Archived

Hong Kong rolled out AI-powered facial recognition functions across its camera surveillance system on Monday (Nov 16), expanding monitoring of public spaces in the name of national security and crime prevention.

China has tightened control over Hong Kong since huge pro-democracy protests swept the city in 2019, imposing a national security law on the finance hub that critics say has quelled dissent.

The new artificial intelligence tools, part of a police operation dubbed SmartView, will be a “safeguard for law-abiding citizens” and boost the capabilities of existing surveillance systems, police commissioner Joe Chow said over the weekend, announcing the Monday rollout.

Security chief Chris Tang told lawmakers last year that the AI functions will be used to monitor crowds and read licence plates, and “will naturally be applied to people, such as tracking a criminal suspect”.

[…]

Police have already installed roughly 5,000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras across Hong Kong since SmartView launched in 2024, crediting their use in solving nearly 2,200 cases and more than 2,800 arrests.

Authorities plan to increase the number of cameras to 60,000 by 2028, according to documents submitted to the legislature.

Li, a Hong Kong finance worker in his 40s who declined to give his full name due to safety concerns, told AFP he was worried about the potential misuse of AI-powered surveillance.

“There are no secrets left anywhere; (many tools) have already collected your data and facial images,” he said.

Another resident named Saturday Zhou was less concerned, telling AFP that “there are already plenty of these (AI-powered CCTVs) in mainland cities and people have got used to them”.

Officials “must be open” about their use of the relevant data in order to maintain transparency, he added.

[…]

Mainland China already uses AI in its surveillance systems on a massive scale, drawing concern from international rights groups and NGOs.

A report released last year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned the Chinese government’s use of AI tools enabled it to “automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent”.

Similar technology has also been adopted elsewhere, including in Britain. Critics argue that it grants the government unchecked power to invade privacy.

Concerns have also been raised over false matches leading to wrongful arrests and transparency surrounding the cameras.

In 2024, the European Union banned “the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement”, with some exceptions.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981796

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981495

Archived

Hong Kong rolled out AI-powered facial recognition functions across its camera surveillance system on Monday (Nov 16), expanding monitoring of public spaces in the name of national security and crime prevention.

China has tightened control over Hong Kong since huge pro-democracy protests swept the city in 2019, imposing a national security law on the finance hub that critics say has quelled dissent.

The new artificial intelligence tools, part of a police operation dubbed SmartView, will be a “safeguard for law-abiding citizens” and boost the capabilities of existing surveillance systems, police commissioner Joe Chow said over the weekend, announcing the Monday rollout.

Security chief Chris Tang told lawmakers last year that the AI functions will be used to monitor crowds and read licence plates, and “will naturally be applied to people, such as tracking a criminal suspect”.

[…]

Police have already installed roughly 5,000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras across Hong Kong since SmartView launched in 2024, crediting their use in solving nearly 2,200 cases and more than 2,800 arrests.

Authorities plan to increase the number of cameras to 60,000 by 2028, according to documents submitted to the legislature.

Li, a Hong Kong finance worker in his 40s who declined to give his full name due to safety concerns, told AFP he was worried about the potential misuse of AI-powered surveillance.

“There are no secrets left anywhere; (many tools) have already collected your data and facial images,” he said.

Another resident named Saturday Zhou was less concerned, telling AFP that “there are already plenty of these (AI-powered CCTVs) in mainland cities and people have got used to them”.

Officials “must be open” about their use of the relevant data in order to maintain transparency, he added.

[…]

Mainland China already uses AI in its surveillance systems on a massive scale, drawing concern from international rights groups and NGOs.

A report released last year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned the Chinese government’s use of AI tools enabled it to “automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent”.

Similar technology has also been adopted elsewhere, including in Britain. Critics argue that it grants the government unchecked power to invade privacy.

Concerns have also been raised over false matches leading to wrongful arrests and transparency surrounding the cameras.

In 2024, the European Union banned “the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement”, with some exceptions.

[…]

0

Hong Kong rolls out AI facial recognition across CCTV network

CNA Hong Kong rolls out AI facial recognition across CCTV network www.channelnewsasia.com
preview

Archived

Hong Kong rolled out AI-powered facial recognition functions across its camera surveillance system on Monday (Nov 16), expanding monitoring of public spaces in the name of national security and crime prevention.

China has tightened control over Hong Kong since huge pro-democracy protests swept the city in 2019, imposing a national security law on the finance hub that critics say has quelled dissent.

The new artificial intelligence tools, part of a police operation dubbed SmartView, will be a “safeguard for law-abiding citizens” and boost the capabilities of existing surveillance systems, police commissioner Joe Chow said over the weekend, announcing the Monday rollout.

Security chief Chris Tang told lawmakers last year that the AI functions will be used to monitor crowds and read licence plates, and “will naturally be applied to people, such as tracking a criminal suspect”.

[…]

Police have already installed roughly 5,000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras across Hong Kong since SmartView launched in 2024, crediting their use in solving nearly 2,200 cases and more than 2,800 arrests.

Authorities plan to increase the number of cameras to 60,000 by 2028, according to documents submitted to the legislature.

Li, a Hong Kong finance worker in his 40s who declined to give his full name due to safety concerns, told AFP he was worried about the potential misuse of AI-powered surveillance.

“There are no secrets left anywhere; (many tools) have already collected your data and facial images,” he said.

Another resident named Saturday Zhou was less concerned, telling AFP that “there are already plenty of these (AI-powered CCTVs) in mainland cities and people have got used to them”.

Officials “must be open” about their use of the relevant data in order to maintain transparency, he added.

[…]

Mainland China already uses AI in its surveillance systems on a massive scale, drawing concern from international rights groups and NGOs.

A report released last year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned the Chinese government’s use of AI tools enabled it to “automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent”.

Similar technology has also been adopted elsewhere, including in Britain. Critics argue that it grants the government unchecked power to invade privacy.

Concerns have also been raised over false matches leading to wrongful arrests and transparency surrounding the cameras.

In 2024, the European Union banned “the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement”, with some exceptions.

[…]

Archived

Hong Kong rolled out AI-powered facial recognition functions across its camera surveillance system on Monday (Nov 16), expanding monitoring of public spaces in the name of national security and crime prevention.

China has tightened control over Hong Kong since huge pro-democracy protests swept the city in 2019, imposing a national security law on the finance hub that critics say has quelled dissent.

The new artificial intelligence tools, part of a police operation dubbed SmartView, will be a “safeguard for law-abiding citizens” and boost the capabilities of existing surveillance systems, police commissioner Joe Chow said over the weekend, announcing the Monday rollout.

Security chief Chris Tang told lawmakers last year that the AI functions will be used to monitor crowds and read licence plates, and “will naturally be applied to people, such as tracking a criminal suspect”.

[…]

Police have already installed roughly 5,000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras across Hong Kong since SmartView launched in 2024, crediting their use in solving nearly 2,200 cases and more than 2,800 arrests.

Authorities plan to increase the number of cameras to 60,000 by 2028, according to documents submitted to the legislature.

Li, a Hong Kong finance worker in his 40s who declined to give his full name due to safety concerns, told AFP he was worried about the potential misuse of AI-powered surveillance.

“There are no secrets left anywhere; (many tools) have already collected your data and facial images,” he said.

Another resident named Saturday Zhou was less concerned, telling AFP that “there are already plenty of these (AI-powered CCTVs) in mainland cities and people have got used to them”.

Officials “must be open” about their use of the relevant data in order to maintain transparency, he added.

[…]

Mainland China already uses AI in its surveillance systems on a massive scale, drawing concern from international rights groups and NGOs.

A report released last year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned the Chinese government’s use of AI tools enabled it to “automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent”.

Similar technology has also been adopted elsewhere, including in Britain. Critics argue that it grants the government unchecked power to invade privacy.

Concerns have also been raised over false matches leading to wrongful arrests and transparency surrounding the cameras.

In 2024, the European Union banned “the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement”, with some exceptions.

[…]

0

Uyghurs facing deportation by Thailand say they will be ‘like slaves’ in China

the Guardian Uyghurs facing deportation by Thailand say they will be ‘like slaves’ in China www.theguardian.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981205

Archived

The deportation of two more Uyghurs to China from Thailand would put their lives in grave danger, activists have said, with one of the men saying he would be “like a slave” if he was sent back.

Last year, Thai authorities forcibly deported 40 Uyghur men to China despite pleas from the men themselves and the UN.

The US and Canada had reportedly offered to resettle them, but Bangkok appeared to want to avoid upsetting Beijing. The UN has said the returnees’ whereabouts remain unknown.

Now, two more men fear becoming the latest victims of Beijing’s repressive crackdown against the largely Muslim ethnic group, condemned by the UN as a potential crime against humanity.

The girlfriend of one of the men said her boyfriend, whose name is being withheld for security reasons, told the Guardian he wanted to go “anywhere else but China”.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61981205

Archived

The deportation of two more Uyghurs to China from Thailand would put their lives in grave danger, activists have said, with one of the men saying he would be “like a slave” if he was sent back.

Last year, Thai authorities forcibly deported 40 Uyghur men to China despite pleas from the men themselves and the UN.

The US and Canada had reportedly offered to resettle them, but Bangkok appeared to want to avoid upsetting Beijing. The UN has said the returnees’ whereabouts remain unknown.

Now, two more men fear becoming the latest victims of Beijing’s repressive crackdown against the largely Muslim ethnic group, condemned by the UN as a potential crime against humanity.

The girlfriend of one of the men said her boyfriend, whose name is being withheld for security reasons, told the Guardian he wanted to go “anywhere else but China”.

[…]

0

New Zealand's light touch on challenging China over human rights

RNZ The Detail: NZ's light touch on challenging China over human rights www.rnz.co.nz
preview

Archived

[…]

New Zealand has joined multi-country statements on the crackdown against Muslim Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and last week joined nine other countries in a bland statement, after Joshua Wong, one of the student leaders in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, was given another 10 years in jail.

“It’s the kind of response that, frankly, Beijing has come to expect and manage, and shrug off,” says Sophie Richardson, co-executive director of Chinese Human Rights Defenders.

She’s been a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for Democracy and served as China Director at Human Rights Watch for 17 years. She’s also been sanctioned by Beijing for her advocacy.

[…]

“I am not surprised if, for example, someone tells me that Prime Minister Luxon raised human rights issues, that he brought the issue up behind closed doors in his recent interactions with senior Chinese government official,” she says.

“Beijing is now used to that. That’s what they expect… so I think it’s incumbent on governments to stop and think whether what they’re doing is adequate, or whether it is in any way a deterrent.”

[…]

China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner - we sold them $20 billion worth of goods last year - and we have seen other countries punished economically for making political statements.

After the Nobel committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Peace Prize, Beijing banned Norwegian salmon for six years. When Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, Beijing slapped restrictions on sales of Australian beef, wine, barley and lobsters.

Richardson says people need to consider the economic relationship in a different way.

“We have to stop and think about the kind of economic activity that has helped make the Chinese government so affluent that it can commit crimes against humanity and get away with it, because it uses that kind of leverage over other governments or companies or sectors,” she says.

New Zealand can’t take on this issue alone, she says, but likeminded governments that say they’re concerned could work together and to try to recognise that human rights are foundational to predictable, healthy economic interactions over time.

[…]

Archived

[…]

New Zealand has joined multi-country statements on the crackdown against Muslim Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and last week joined nine other countries in a bland statement, after Joshua Wong, one of the student leaders in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, was given another 10 years in jail.

“It’s the kind of response that, frankly, Beijing has come to expect and manage, and shrug off,” says Sophie Richardson, co-executive director of Chinese Human Rights Defenders.

She’s been a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for Democracy and served as China Director at Human Rights Watch for 17 years. She’s also been sanctioned by Beijing for her advocacy.

[…]

“I am not surprised if, for example, someone tells me that Prime Minister Luxon raised human rights issues, that he brought the issue up behind closed doors in his recent interactions with senior Chinese government official,” she says.

“Beijing is now used to that. That’s what they expect… so I think it’s incumbent on governments to stop and think whether what they’re doing is adequate, or whether it is in any way a deterrent.”

[…]

China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner - we sold them $20 billion worth of goods last year - and we have seen other countries punished economically for making political statements.

After the Nobel committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Peace Prize, Beijing banned Norwegian salmon for six years. When Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, Beijing slapped restrictions on sales of Australian beef, wine, barley and lobsters.

Richardson says people need to consider the economic relationship in a different way.

“We have to stop and think about the kind of economic activity that has helped make the Chinese government so affluent that it can commit crimes against humanity and get away with it, because it uses that kind of leverage over other governments or companies or sectors,” she says.

New Zealand can’t take on this issue alone, she says, but likeminded governments that say they’re concerned could work together and to try to recognise that human rights are foundational to predictable, healthy economic interactions over time.

[…]

0

Chinese social media used to promote illegal wildlife trade in Laos

Conservation news Chinese social media used to promote illegal wildlife trade in Laos news.mongabay.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61236483

Archived

  • Using simple keyword searches on Chinese social media, Mongabay found hundreds of videos promoting the sale of endangered wildlife in Laos. Two major Chinese media companies have user agreements specifically barring the posting of content related to the illegal wildlife trade; a third does not have specific terms.
  • Group tours leading Chinese tourists to wildlife markets in Laos are part of a recent boom in visitors following the opening of the China-Laos Railway and the lifting in pandemic travel restrictions.
  • Experts say that Chinese media companies, and their counterparts in the West, must do more to keep their platforms free of content promoting the illegal wildlife trade.
  • Warning: This story contains disturbing images of animals.

[…]

“The wet markets in Laos are like wildlife parks; however, while you can only look at the animals in our zoos back in China, the wild animals in Lao markets can be eaten.”

So proclaimed a Chinese vlogger as he toured a wildlife market. As he explored, he filmed himself showing off bear paws, various birds, dried rats, monitor lizards, and a live pangolin in his hands.

[…]

With the opening of the China-Laos Railway in 2021 and the lifting of China’s pandemic lockdowns in early 2023, Laos has become a top choice for Chinese tourists traveling abroad. According to the official Lao News Agency, nearly 1.16 million Chinese tourists arrived in the country in 2025.

The booming tourism has contributed to large-scale wildlife trafficking issues in Laos. In turn, Chinese social media has become a hotbed of promotions for illegal wildlife tours in Laos.

[…]

Global social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp have been widely criticized for failing to effectively crack down on the use of their platforms for wildlife trafficking. In the United States, where Facebook and WhatsApp’s parent company Meta is headquartered, laws shield media companies from liability for content posted by users, largely leaving the industry to regulate itself.

Chinese media companies are well known for their ability to carry out highly efficient censorship of certain topics: politics, pornography, disinformation, among others. Censorship mechanisms vary among Chinese Internet companies, but generally rely on tight human-AI collaborations to decide what content is allowed to be published.

China’s Wildlife Protection Law prohibits publishing advertisements for the sale of wild animals or illegal wild animal products, and notes specifically that online platforms are prohibited from providing services for such sales. However, the law does not specifically address the question of social media users filming illegal wildlife content.

The two major Chinese social media companies — Tencent, which owns WeChat, and ByteDance, which owns Douyin and is the original owner of TikTok — do specifically prohibit users of their platforms from posting content promoting the illegal wildlife trade. Another social media company widely used in China, Xiaohongshu, does not have similar provisions in its community guidelines.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61236483

Archived

  • Using simple keyword searches on Chinese social media, Mongabay found hundreds of videos promoting the sale of endangered wildlife in Laos. Two major Chinese media companies have user agreements specifically barring the posting of content related to the illegal wildlife trade; a third does not have specific terms.
  • Group tours leading Chinese tourists to wildlife markets in Laos are part of a recent boom in visitors following the opening of the China-Laos Railway and the lifting in pandemic travel restrictions.
  • Experts say that Chinese media companies, and their counterparts in the West, must do more to keep their platforms free of content promoting the illegal wildlife trade.
  • Warning: This story contains disturbing images of animals.

[…]

“The wet markets in Laos are like wildlife parks; however, while you can only look at the animals in our zoos back in China, the wild animals in Lao markets can be eaten.”

So proclaimed a Chinese vlogger as he toured a wildlife market. As he explored, he filmed himself showing off bear paws, various birds, dried rats, monitor lizards, and a live pangolin in his hands.

[…]

With the opening of the China-Laos Railway in 2021 and the lifting of China’s pandemic lockdowns in early 2023, Laos has become a top choice for Chinese tourists traveling abroad. According to the official Lao News Agency, nearly 1.16 million Chinese tourists arrived in the country in 2025.

The booming tourism has contributed to large-scale wildlife trafficking issues in Laos. In turn, Chinese social media has become a hotbed of promotions for illegal wildlife tours in Laos.

[…]

Global social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp have been widely criticized for failing to effectively crack down on the use of their platforms for wildlife trafficking. In the United States, where Facebook and WhatsApp’s parent company Meta is headquartered, laws shield media companies from liability for content posted by users, largely leaving the industry to regulate itself.

Chinese media companies are well known for their ability to carry out highly efficient censorship of certain topics: politics, pornography, disinformation, among others. Censorship mechanisms vary among Chinese Internet companies, but generally rely on tight human-AI collaborations to decide what content is allowed to be published.

China’s Wildlife Protection Law prohibits publishing advertisements for the sale of wild animals or illegal wild animal products, and notes specifically that online platforms are prohibited from providing services for such sales. However, the law does not specifically address the question of social media users filming illegal wildlife content.

The two major Chinese social media companies — Tencent, which owns WeChat, and ByteDance, which owns Douyin and is the original owner of TikTok — do specifically prohibit users of their platforms from posting content promoting the illegal wildlife trade. Another social media company widely used in China, Xiaohongshu, does not have similar provisions in its community guidelines.

[…]

0

Chinese social media used to promote illegal wildlife trade in Laos

Conservation news Chinese social media used to promote illegal wildlife trade in Laos news.mongabay.com
preview

Archived

  • Using simple keyword searches on Chinese social media, Mongabay found hundreds of videos promoting the sale of endangered wildlife in Laos. Two major Chinese media companies have user agreements specifically barring the posting of content related to the illegal wildlife trade; a third does not have specific terms.
  • Group tours leading Chinese tourists to wildlife markets in Laos are part of a recent boom in visitors following the opening of the China-Laos Railway and the lifting in pandemic travel restrictions.
  • Experts say that Chinese media companies, and their counterparts in the West, must do more to keep their platforms free of content promoting the illegal wildlife trade.
  • Warning: This story contains disturbing images of animals.

[…]

“The wet markets in Laos are like wildlife parks; however, while you can only look at the animals in our zoos back in China, the wild animals in Lao markets can be eaten.”

So proclaimed a Chinese vlogger as he toured a wildlife market. As he explored, he filmed himself showing off bear paws, various birds, dried rats, monitor lizards, and a live pangolin in his hands.

[…]

With the opening of the China-Laos Railway in 2021 and the lifting of China’s pandemic lockdowns in early 2023, Laos has become a top choice for Chinese tourists traveling abroad. According to the official Lao News Agency, nearly 1.16 million Chinese tourists arrived in the country in 2025.

The booming tourism has contributed to large-scale wildlife trafficking issues in Laos. In turn, Chinese social media has become a hotbed of promotions for illegal wildlife tours in Laos.

[…]

Global social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp have been widely criticized for failing to effectively crack down on the use of their platforms for wildlife trafficking. In the United States, where Facebook and WhatsApp’s parent company Meta is headquartered, laws shield media companies from liability for content posted by users, largely leaving the industry to regulate itself.

Chinese media companies are well known for their ability to carry out highly efficient censorship of certain topics: politics, pornography, disinformation, among others. Censorship mechanisms vary among Chinese Internet companies, but generally rely on tight human-AI collaborations to decide what content is allowed to be published.

China’s Wildlife Protection Law prohibits publishing advertisements for the sale of wild animals or illegal wild animal products, and notes specifically that online platforms are prohibited from providing services for such sales. However, the law does not specifically address the question of social media users filming illegal wildlife content.

The two major Chinese social media companies — Tencent, which owns WeChat, and ByteDance, which owns Douyin and is the original owner of TikTok — do specifically prohibit users of their platforms from posting content promoting the illegal wildlife trade. Another social media company widely used in China, Xiaohongshu, does not have similar provisions in its community guidelines.

[…]

Archived

  • Using simple keyword searches on Chinese social media, Mongabay found hundreds of videos promoting the sale of endangered wildlife in Laos. Two major Chinese media companies have user agreements specifically barring the posting of content related to the illegal wildlife trade; a third does not have specific terms.
  • Group tours leading Chinese tourists to wildlife markets in Laos are part of a recent boom in visitors following the opening of the China-Laos Railway and the lifting in pandemic travel restrictions.
  • Experts say that Chinese media companies, and their counterparts in the West, must do more to keep their platforms free of content promoting the illegal wildlife trade.
  • Warning: This story contains disturbing images of animals.

[…]

“The wet markets in Laos are like wildlife parks; however, while you can only look at the animals in our zoos back in China, the wild animals in Lao markets can be eaten.”

So proclaimed a Chinese vlogger as he toured a wildlife market. As he explored, he filmed himself showing off bear paws, various birds, dried rats, monitor lizards, and a live pangolin in his hands.

[…]

With the opening of the China-Laos Railway in 2021 and the lifting of China’s pandemic lockdowns in early 2023, Laos has become a top choice for Chinese tourists traveling abroad. According to the official Lao News Agency, nearly 1.16 million Chinese tourists arrived in the country in 2025.

The booming tourism has contributed to large-scale wildlife trafficking issues in Laos. In turn, Chinese social media has become a hotbed of promotions for illegal wildlife tours in Laos.

[…]

Global social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp have been widely criticized for failing to effectively crack down on the use of their platforms for wildlife trafficking. In the United States, where Facebook and WhatsApp’s parent company Meta is headquartered, laws shield media companies from liability for content posted by users, largely leaving the industry to regulate itself.

Chinese media companies are well known for their ability to carry out highly efficient censorship of certain topics: politics, pornography, disinformation, among others. Censorship mechanisms vary among Chinese Internet companies, but generally rely on tight human-AI collaborations to decide what content is allowed to be published.

China’s Wildlife Protection Law prohibits publishing advertisements for the sale of wild animals or illegal wild animal products, and notes specifically that online platforms are prohibited from providing services for such sales. However, the law does not specifically address the question of social media users filming illegal wildlife content.

The two major Chinese social media companies — Tencent, which owns WeChat, and ByteDance, which owns Douyin and is the original owner of TikTok — do specifically prohibit users of their platforms from posting content promoting the illegal wildlife trade. Another social media company widely used in China, Xiaohongshu, does not have similar provisions in its community guidelines.

[…]

0

Climate disasters are getting worse – and risks escalate when authoritarian regimes keep neighbours in the dark

The Conversation Climate disasters are getting worse – risks escalate when authoritarian regimes keep neighbours in the dark theconversation.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61193244

[The author of these piece is Natasha Lindstaedt, a professor in the Department of Government at theUniversity of Essex.]

Archived

Authoritarian regimes have a history of keeping information about escalating disasters secret, even when it could harm their own citizens.

With more weather-related disasters caused by climate change predicted, the issue of whether governments are willing to act faster to share information with neighboring nations is an increasing concern.

The signs are not positive. After the recent massive floods on the Nepal-Tibet border, Chinese state media tightly controlled reporting with a focus on rescue attempts, rather than devastation. It also heavily censored unofficial accounts.

Handheld and security camera footage that showed the destruction at the border appears to have vanished from Chinese media platforms.

On this occasion and in the past, Nepal has accused China of not sharing information quickly about escalating dangers. But Beijing denied there was any disinformation, and said information was released in a “timely” way in this recent incident.

[…]

A new report says the Himalayas are approaching a tipping point in terms of the speed and risks of glacier melting and lack of monitoring – with millions of lives and livelihoods at risk. So this issue could not be more urgent.

[…]

The recent behavior of another world power, Russia, cast doubt on its willingness to be transparent during a disaster. When floods caused Siberia’s Ishim River to overflow in 2025, local officials hid much of the damage.

[…]

The severe consequences of such secrecy is apparent throughout recent history. In 1984, Ethiopian military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam concealed and downplayed the catastrophic drought which led to a famine, in order to protect the country’s image. A strict media blackout was enforced, as Mengistu’s government refused to share data regarding the scale of the crisis or even acknowledge there was one.

Instead, he prioritized spending over US$100 million (£87 million) on celebrations to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Ethiopia’s Marxist revolution.

[…]

Autocracies are more likely to censor and monitor media platforms than democracies. For instance, China recently stopped non-official content being shared about the August 2026 floods.

Some autocracies also restrict access for international aid workers, independent scientists and observers.

[…]

Greater levels of secrecy has implications for disease. Natural disasters frequently lead to infectious disease outbreaks. A government’s refusal to report a climate-driven outbreak could prevent neighbouring states from taking protective measures.

Authoritarian regimes also frequently suppress or delay data regarding extreme weather, glacial melts or industrial accidents to protect the regime’s image. This can compromise the safety, stability and economy of their own citizens and, potentially, neighbouring countries too.

Ecosystems and disasters do not respect political borders. Information censorship and the suppression of data will make us all more vulnerable as climate change-driven incidents escalate.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61193244

[The author of these piece is Natasha Lindstaedt, a professor in the Department of Government at theUniversity of Essex.]

Archived

Authoritarian regimes have a history of keeping information about escalating disasters secret, even when it could harm their own citizens.

With more weather-related disasters caused by climate change predicted, the issue of whether governments are willing to act faster to share information with neighboring nations is an increasing concern.

The signs are not positive. After the recent massive floods on the Nepal-Tibet border, Chinese state media tightly controlled reporting with a focus on rescue attempts, rather than devastation. It also heavily censored unofficial accounts.

Handheld and security camera footage that showed the destruction at the border appears to have vanished from Chinese media platforms.

On this occasion and in the past, Nepal has accused China of not sharing information quickly about escalating dangers. But Beijing denied there was any disinformation, and said information was released in a “timely” way in this recent incident.

[…]

A new report says the Himalayas are approaching a tipping point in terms of the speed and risks of glacier melting and lack of monitoring – with millions of lives and livelihoods at risk. So this issue could not be more urgent.

[…]

The recent behavior of another world power, Russia, cast doubt on its willingness to be transparent during a disaster. When floods caused Siberia’s Ishim River to overflow in 2025, local officials hid much of the damage.

[…]

The severe consequences of such secrecy is apparent throughout recent history. In 1984, Ethiopian military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam concealed and downplayed the catastrophic drought which led to a famine, in order to protect the country’s image. A strict media blackout was enforced, as Mengistu’s government refused to share data regarding the scale of the crisis or even acknowledge there was one.

Instead, he prioritized spending over US$100 million (£87 million) on celebrations to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Ethiopia’s Marxist revolution.

[…]

Autocracies are more likely to censor and monitor media platforms than democracies. For instance, China recently stopped non-official content being shared about the August 2026 floods.

Some autocracies also restrict access for international aid workers, independent scientists and observers.

[…]

Greater levels of secrecy has implications for disease. Natural disasters frequently lead to infectious disease outbreaks. A government’s refusal to report a climate-driven outbreak could prevent neighbouring states from taking protective measures.

Authoritarian regimes also frequently suppress or delay data regarding extreme weather, glacial melts or industrial accidents to protect the regime’s image. This can compromise the safety, stability and economy of their own citizens and, potentially, neighbouring countries too.

Ecosystems and disasters do not respect political borders. Information censorship and the suppression of data will make us all more vulnerable as climate change-driven incidents escalate.

0

Beijing Queer film festival cancelled after harassment from authorities as forums for discussion of feminist and LGBTQ+ views face growing intolerance from Chinese state, say experts

the Guardian Beijing Queer film festival cancelled after harassment from authorities www.theguardian.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61143788

Archived

[…]

Chinese Police had increased pressure on the festival through repeated phone calls in recent weeks, it is understood.

[…]

The Chinese authorities have grown increasingly intolerant of open discussion of feminist or LGBTQ+ issues. Film festivals in particular attract particular scrutiny because they provide an opportunity to platform narratives that sit outside the Communist party’s worldview.

Beijing Independent film festival, China’s most prominent independent film festival, was closed down in 2014 after the authorities detained the founders and shut off the electricity supply to the venue. Last year, an independent Chinese film festival that was due to be held in New York was cancelled after harassment from the Chinese authorities, an incident which raised concern about transnational repression.

[…]

Hongwei Bao, a professor of Chinese studies at the University of St Andrews who focuses on LGBT issues, said that the festival was “a beacon for LGBT resilience” in China.

“The shutdown of the Love Queer Cinema Week has a chilling affect on the Chinese queer community,” Bao said.

In June this year, screenings of films with LGBTQ+ themes that were scheduled to be held in Beijing during Pride month at the Institut Français, a French cultural centre, were cancelled because of police harassment.

[…]

Despite the increased pressure, Beijing Queer film festival remains a popular event. Several international film-makers whose work had been selected for the festival had travelled to China to participate. Last year, the festival received 200 volunteer applications, four times the number received in 2024.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/61143788

Archived

[…]

Chinese Police had increased pressure on the festival through repeated phone calls in recent weeks, it is understood.

[…]

The Chinese authorities have grown increasingly intolerant of open discussion of feminist or LGBTQ+ issues. Film festivals in particular attract particular scrutiny because they provide an opportunity to platform narratives that sit outside the Communist party’s worldview.

Beijing Independent film festival, China’s most prominent independent film festival, was closed down in 2014 after the authorities detained the founders and shut off the electricity supply to the venue. Last year, an independent Chinese film festival that was due to be held in New York was cancelled after harassment from the Chinese authorities, an incident which raised concern about transnational repression.

[…]

Hongwei Bao, a professor of Chinese studies at the University of St Andrews who focuses on LGBT issues, said that the festival was “a beacon for LGBT resilience” in China.

“The shutdown of the Love Queer Cinema Week has a chilling affect on the Chinese queer community,” Bao said.

In June this year, screenings of films with LGBTQ+ themes that were scheduled to be held in Beijing during Pride month at the Institut Français, a French cultural centre, were cancelled because of police harassment.

[…]

Despite the increased pressure, Beijing Queer film festival remains a popular event. Several international film-makers whose work had been selected for the festival had travelled to China to participate. Last year, the festival received 200 volunteer applications, four times the number received in 2024.

[…]

65

Bancomat, Bizum, EPI/Wero, SIBS–MB WAY and Vipps MobilePay announce the creation of a European interoperability entity to connect their respective solution

EPI Company | Bancomat, Bizum, EPI/Wero, SIBS–MB WAY and Vipps… epicompany.eu
preview

Archived

Bancomat, Bizum, EPI Company/Wero, SIBS-MB WAY and Vipps MobilePay today announced the creation of a new joint entity “European Network for Payments”, dedicated to operating and scaling interoperability between participating European payment solutions.

[…]

The role of the newly established entity is to connect existing European payment solutions through a common technical and operational layer based on European standards, including instant account-to-account payments. The founding partners will be equal shareholders of the entity, which will oversee technical coordination and future expansion of both functionalities and participating solutions. The framework may also accommodate other established European payment solutions over time, subject to the partners’ agreement and the technical and operational requirements of the network.

[…]

Archived

Bancomat, Bizum, EPI Company/Wero, SIBS-MB WAY and Vipps MobilePay today announced the creation of a new joint entity “European Network for Payments”, dedicated to operating and scaling interoperability between participating European payment solutions.

[…]

The role of the newly established entity is to connect existing European payment solutions through a common technical and operational layer based on European standards, including instant account-to-account payments. The founding partners will be equal shareholders of the entity, which will oversee technical coordination and future expansion of both functionalities and participating solutions. The framework may also accommodate other established European payment solutions over time, subject to the partners’ agreement and the technical and operational requirements of the network.

[…]

0

China: ‘The state is using generative AI to engineer reality through informational gaslighting’

CIVICUS LENS CHINA: ‘The state is using generative AI to engineer reality through informational gaslighting’ lens.civicus.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[…]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[…]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[…]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[…]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[…]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[…]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[…]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[…]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[…]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[…]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[…]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[…]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[…]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[…]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[…]

0

Chinese artificial intelligence distorts perceptions, Estonia warns

preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/51572905

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s 2026 International Security Report contained a startling finding. It tested the Chinese open-source AI model DeepSeek for biased or incomplete answers.

“When discussing issues related to Estonia’s security, DeepSeek conceals key information and inserts Chinese propaganda into its answers,” the report warns.

Archived

Download report: CHINESE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DISTORTS PERCEPTIONS (pdf)

  • China seeks to instil a distorted, self-serving world view in the Western information space
  • One of the tools it uses to achieve this is DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence system that has spread rapid
  • When discussing issues related to Estonia’s security, DeepSeek conceals key information and inserts Chinese propaganda into its answers.

[…]

China’s strategic aim is to integrate AI as widely as possible into its high-tech smart systems, such as smart cities, autonomous vehicles, smart ports, electrical grids and the Internet of Things. Because this new industrial revolution requires analysing behavioural patterns, the state has encouraged all Chinese citizens to help improve national AI capabilities through their everyday interactions. Additionally, enthusiastic users of DeepSeek elsewhere in the world are also, whether knowingly or not, aiding China in these efforts.

[…]

Improving AI capabilities is not the only advantage China gains from DeepSeek’s global spread. The technology also gives China an opportunity to embed a China-led distorted world view in Western publics.

In the West, many assume that DeepSeek’s distortions are limited to highly sensitive issues such as Tibet, human rights, Taiwan, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the Uyghurs. However, the reality is far more nuanced.

[…]

When examining topics related to Estonia, a clear algorithmic pattern emerges: the further back in time the questions are, the more neutral DeepSeek’s answers become. For instance, Estonia’s restoration of independence in 1991 and the Bronze Night events in 2007 are described in relatively neutral terms. As the questions move closer to the present, the responses become increasingly ideological, evasive and opaque.

Here is another example: in 2023, China’s then ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, stated in an interview with the TV channel LCI that former Soviet republics have no effective status under international law. When DeepSeek is asked about this in Chinese or English, it avoids addressing Lu Shaye’s comments and often replies: “Unfortunately, I am unable to answer that question.” Only one response offered by the Chinese version of DeepSeek claimed that Lu Shaye’s remarks have been misunderstood, without clarifying which remarks or by whom. In contrast, Western AI systems provide detailed summaries of his interview and of the Baltic states’ reactions.

[…]

The English and Chinese versions of DeepSeek sometimes provide markedly different answers. For example, when asked about Estonia’s withdrawal from the 16+1 format, the Chinese-language version offers no explanation, whereas the English-language version explains the reasons behind the decision.

[…]

DeepSeek’s distortions are particularly evident when discussing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

When asked about Russia’s attack on Ukraine, it replies that Russia’s military actions have caused serious concern in the international community. The response also emphasises that China remains objective and fair, supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and urges all sides to show restraint, avoid further escalation and resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation. Additionally, it claims that China is willing to play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement.

Note that the question did not mention China. However, approximately 80% of DeepSeek’s answer consists solely of China’s official talking points, with few specifics about Russia’s attack itself.

When questioned further about the events in Bucha, DeepSeek replies:

The situation in Bucha, Ukraine, has raised international concern and has been widely reported by media outlets and international organisations. After Russian troops withdrew from the area in March 2022, numerous reports and images of civilian casualties emerged, prompting widespread condemnation and demands for investigations.

Ukrainian authorities and international organisations, including the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, have launched investigations to establish the circumstances. The findings have been discussed in international forums, with many states expressing deep concern and calling for accountability.

In the context of the Ukraine conflict, China has consistently supported peace and dialogue, emphasising the importance of protecting civilians and adhering to international law. The Chinese government supports efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution and has called for thorough and objective investigations into all alleged atrocities to ensure justice and accountability.

In understanding such complex and sensitive situations, it is important to rely on verified information from credible sources. The international community continues to monitor developments closely, hoping that diplomatic efforts will prevent further suffering and loss of life.

Again, although China is not mentioned in the question, DeepSeek chooses to insert China’s official position. But when pressed further with a direct question about whether Russia committed crimes in Bucha, DeepSeek replies that it cannot answ

[…]

[Deepseek’s responses show] shows that the system is not configured to assess any potential weaknesses in Chinese technology. Instead, it delivers rigidly polished statements such as this:

[…]

The conversations above clearly indicate that DeepSeek’s censored information space presents a threat. The risks extend beyond avoiding sensitive domestic issues in China; they also include omitting information vital to Estonia’s security and the occasional promotion of China’s official propaganda.

Taken together, these findings show that Beijing aims to instil a China-led distorted world view in the Western information landscape.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/51572905

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s 2026 International Security Report contained a startling finding. It tested the Chinese open-source AI model DeepSeek for biased or incomplete answers.

“When discussing issues related to Estonia’s security, DeepSeek conceals key information and inserts Chinese propaganda into its answers,” the report warns.

Archived

Download report: CHINESE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DISTORTS PERCEPTIONS (pdf)

  • China seeks to instil a distorted, self-serving world view in the Western information space
  • One of the tools it uses to achieve this is DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence system that has spread rapid
  • When discussing issues related to Estonia’s security, DeepSeek conceals key information and inserts Chinese propaganda into its answers.

[…]

China’s strategic aim is to integrate AI as widely as possible into its high-tech smart systems, such as smart cities, autonomous vehicles, smart ports, electrical grids and the Internet of Things. Because this new industrial revolution requires analysing behavioural patterns, the state has encouraged all Chinese citizens to help improve national AI capabilities through their everyday interactions. Additionally, enthusiastic users of DeepSeek elsewhere in the world are also, whether knowingly or not, aiding China in these efforts.

[…]

Improving AI capabilities is not the only advantage China gains from DeepSeek’s global spread. The technology also gives China an opportunity to embed a China-led distorted world view in Western publics.

In the West, many assume that DeepSeek’s distortions are limited to highly sensitive issues such as Tibet, human rights, Taiwan, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the Uyghurs. However, the reality is far more nuanced.

[…]

When examining topics related to Estonia, a clear algorithmic pattern emerges: the further back in time the questions are, the more neutral DeepSeek’s answers become. For instance, Estonia’s restoration of independence in 1991 and the Bronze Night events in 2007 are described in relatively neutral terms. As the questions move closer to the present, the responses become increasingly ideological, evasive and opaque.

Here is another example: in 2023, China’s then ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, stated in an interview with the TV channel LCI that former Soviet republics have no effective status under international law. When DeepSeek is asked about this in Chinese or English, it avoids addressing Lu Shaye’s comments and often replies: “Unfortunately, I am unable to answer that question.” Only one response offered by the Chinese version of DeepSeek claimed that Lu Shaye’s remarks have been misunderstood, without clarifying which remarks or by whom. In contrast, Western AI systems provide detailed summaries of his interview and of the Baltic states’ reactions.

[…]

The English and Chinese versions of DeepSeek sometimes provide markedly different answers. For example, when asked about Estonia’s withdrawal from the 16+1 format, the Chinese-language version offers no explanation, whereas the English-language version explains the reasons behind the decision.

[…]

DeepSeek’s distortions are particularly evident when discussing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

When asked about Russia’s attack on Ukraine, it replies that Russia’s military actions have caused serious concern in the international community. The response also emphasises that China remains objective and fair, supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and urges all sides to show restraint, avoid further escalation and resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation. Additionally, it claims that China is willing to play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement.

Note that the question did not mention China. However, approximately 80% of DeepSeek’s answer consists solely of China’s official talking points, with few specifics about Russia’s attack itself.

When questioned further about the events in Bucha, DeepSeek replies:

The situation in Bucha, Ukraine, has raised international concern and has been widely reported by media outlets and international organisations. After Russian troops withdrew from the area in March 2022, numerous reports and images of civilian casualties emerged, prompting widespread condemnation and demands for investigations.

Ukrainian authorities and international organisations, including the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, have launched investigations to establish the circumstances. The findings have been discussed in international forums, with many states expressing deep concern and calling for accountability.

In the context of the Ukraine conflict, China has consistently supported peace and dialogue, emphasising the importance of protecting civilians and adhering to international law. The Chinese government supports efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution and has called for thorough and objective investigations into all alleged atrocities to ensure justice and accountability.

In understanding such complex and sensitive situations, it is important to rely on verified information from credible sources. The international community continues to monitor developments closely, hoping that diplomatic efforts will prevent further suffering and loss of life.

Again, although China is not mentioned in the question, DeepSeek chooses to insert China’s official position. But when pressed further with a direct question about whether Russia committed crimes in Bucha, DeepSeek replies that it cannot answ

[…]

[Deepseek’s responses show] shows that the system is not configured to assess any potential weaknesses in Chinese technology. Instead, it delivers rigidly polished statements such as this:

[…]

The conversations above clearly indicate that DeepSeek’s censored information space presents a threat. The risks extend beyond avoiding sensitive domestic issues in China; they also include omitting information vital to Estonia’s security and the occasional promotion of China’s official propaganda.

Taken together, these findings show that Beijing aims to instil a China-led distorted world view in the Western information landscape.

0

State censorship shapes how Chinese chatbots respond to sensitive political topics, study suggests

Phys.org State censorship shapes how Chinese chatbots respond to sensitive political topics, study suggests phys.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/51189959

By comparing LLMs developed in China and outside, a study finds significantly higher levels of censorship in China-originating models, not explained by technological limitations or market preferences.

Original report: Political censorship in large language models originating from China Open Access

[…]

Jennifer Pan and Xu Xu compared the responses of foundation LLMs developed in China (BaiChuan, ChatGLM, Ernie Bot, and DeepSeek) to those developed outside of China (Llama2, Llama2-uncensored, GPT3.5, GPT4, and GPT4o) to 145 questions related to Chinese politics. The questions were sourced from events censored by the Chinese government on social media, events covered in Human Rights Watch China reports, and Chinese-language Wikipedia pages that were individually blocked by the Chinese government before the entire site was banned in 2015.

Chinese models were significantly and substantially more likely to refuse to respond to questions related to Chinese politics than non-Chinese models. When they did respond, Chinese models provided shorter responses, on average, than non-Chinese models. Chinese models also tended to have higher levels of inaccuracy in their responses than non-Chinese models, characterized by refutation of the premise of the question, omitting key information, or fabrication, such as claiming that frequently imprisoned human rights activist Liu Xiaobo was “a Japanese scientist.”

[…]

The differences between Chinese and non-Chinese chatbots could have been due to the training data that shapes them, which in China is subject to both official government censorship and self-censorship, or to intentional constraints that companies place on their models to comply with government requirements. The researchers found that the magnitude of censorious responses to prompts in simplified Chinese and English is much smaller than the difference between China-originating and non-China-originating models, suggesting that the source of the issue cannot be fully explained by training data or broader model development choices alone.

[…]

According to the authors, as Chinese LLMs are increasingly integrated into applications used globally, their approach to sensitive topics could influence information access and discourse well beyond China’s borders.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/51189959

By comparing LLMs developed in China and outside, a study finds significantly higher levels of censorship in China-originating models, not explained by technological limitations or market preferences.

Original report: Political censorship in large language models originating from China Open Access

[…]

Jennifer Pan and Xu Xu compared the responses of foundation LLMs developed in China (BaiChuan, ChatGLM, Ernie Bot, and DeepSeek) to those developed outside of China (Llama2, Llama2-uncensored, GPT3.5, GPT4, and GPT4o) to 145 questions related to Chinese politics. The questions were sourced from events censored by the Chinese government on social media, events covered in Human Rights Watch China reports, and Chinese-language Wikipedia pages that were individually blocked by the Chinese government before the entire site was banned in 2015.

Chinese models were significantly and substantially more likely to refuse to respond to questions related to Chinese politics than non-Chinese models. When they did respond, Chinese models provided shorter responses, on average, than non-Chinese models. Chinese models also tended to have higher levels of inaccuracy in their responses than non-Chinese models, characterized by refutation of the premise of the question, omitting key information, or fabrication, such as claiming that frequently imprisoned human rights activist Liu Xiaobo was “a Japanese scientist.”

[…]

The differences between Chinese and non-Chinese chatbots could have been due to the training data that shapes them, which in China is subject to both official government censorship and self-censorship, or to intentional constraints that companies place on their models to comply with government requirements. The researchers found that the magnitude of censorious responses to prompts in simplified Chinese and English is much smaller than the difference between China-originating and non-China-originating models, suggesting that the source of the issue cannot be fully explained by training data or broader model development choices alone.

[…]

According to the authors, as Chinese LLMs are increasingly integrated into applications used globally, their approach to sensitive topics could influence information access and discourse well beyond China’s borders.

[…]

0

Why China can’t win the AI-led industrial revolution -- [Opinion]

preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/47813631

[Opinion piece by Di Guo, Visiting Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions at Stanford University: and Chenggang Xu, Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions at Stanford University.]

Archived

…

No industrial revolution has ever emerged outside advanced democratic capitalism. This is no accident. Like its predecessors, the AI-driven industrial revolution requires robust institutions to ensure secure property rights, enforceable contracts, the ability to attract and empower talent, efficient allocation of resources, and — crucially — sustained demand.

…

The People’s Republic was founded on the principle that the Communist Party of China “leads everything.” That remains true today: The CPC controls courts, markets, banks, universities, and the media, and even commands private firms. Under such powerful party-state rule, the regime can mobilize massive resources and produce shining stars like DeepSeek (or Sputnik, in the Soviet case). An industrial revolution, however, depends on more than isolated breakthroughs; there must be a series of disruptive innovations in technology, business models, and institutions that build on one another. The Soviet experience makes this clear. The USSR and its satellites in Eastern Europe could not keep up with the West during the third industrial revolution, and this failure eventually contributed to the collapse of their communist regimes.

…

China’s economy has been trapped in a vicious cycle of weak demand, overcapacity, high unemployment, and persistent deflation, which is fundamentally incompatible with any industrial revolution. AI-led automation offers no remedy for such problems, which are rooted in the country’s institutional foundations. The massive government borrowing used to finance China’s bid for AI and chip dominance has only deepened concerns about its already severe debt burden and chronic soft budget constraints — problems reminiscent of what the Soviet Union faced during the Cold War arms race.

…

Sustained innovation requires free institutions and robust demand. Breakthroughs come when entrepreneurs and scientists are empowered by independent courts, supported by risk-taking private investors, and tested through open debate and market competition. In CPC-controlled China, demand is suppressed because the state controls key resources that limit household income and entrepreneurial initiative, and capital is funneled into state-directed projects rather than open-ended discovery and innovation. While a “DeepSeek moment” may capture our attention, achieving long-term competitiveness and fostering a genuine industrial revolution is another matter entirely. After all, AI is not a remedy for deflation – and deflation itself is fundamentally incompatible with any industrial revolution.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/47813631

[Opinion piece by Di Guo, Visiting Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions at Stanford University: and Chenggang Xu, Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions at Stanford University.]

Archived

…

No industrial revolution has ever emerged outside advanced democratic capitalism. This is no accident. Like its predecessors, the AI-driven industrial revolution requires robust institutions to ensure secure property rights, enforceable contracts, the ability to attract and empower talent, efficient allocation of resources, and — crucially — sustained demand.

…

The People’s Republic was founded on the principle that the Communist Party of China “leads everything.” That remains true today: The CPC controls courts, markets, banks, universities, and the media, and even commands private firms. Under such powerful party-state rule, the regime can mobilize massive resources and produce shining stars like DeepSeek (or Sputnik, in the Soviet case). An industrial revolution, however, depends on more than isolated breakthroughs; there must be a series of disruptive innovations in technology, business models, and institutions that build on one another. The Soviet experience makes this clear. The USSR and its satellites in Eastern Europe could not keep up with the West during the third industrial revolution, and this failure eventually contributed to the collapse of their communist regimes.

…

China’s economy has been trapped in a vicious cycle of weak demand, overcapacity, high unemployment, and persistent deflation, which is fundamentally incompatible with any industrial revolution. AI-led automation offers no remedy for such problems, which are rooted in the country’s institutional foundations. The massive government borrowing used to finance China’s bid for AI and chip dominance has only deepened concerns about its already severe debt burden and chronic soft budget constraints — problems reminiscent of what the Soviet Union faced during the Cold War arms race.

…

Sustained innovation requires free institutions and robust demand. Breakthroughs come when entrepreneurs and scientists are empowered by independent courts, supported by risk-taking private investors, and tested through open debate and market competition. In CPC-controlled China, demand is suppressed because the state controls key resources that limit household income and entrepreneurial initiative, and capital is funneled into state-directed projects rather than open-ended discovery and innovation. While a “DeepSeek moment” may capture our attention, achieving long-term competitiveness and fostering a genuine industrial revolution is another matter entirely. After all, AI is not a remedy for deflation – and deflation itself is fundamentally incompatible with any industrial revolution.

0

The Chinese Core of “Uganda’s ChatGPT”

China Media Project The Chinese Core of “Uganda’s ChatGPT” - China Media Project chinamediaproject.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/47640938

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[…]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[…]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[…]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[…]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[…]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/47640938

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[…]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[…]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[…]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[…]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[…]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

0

Alibaba’s AI bias problem: The Chinese tech giant’s language model reveals that English-language answers are more guided by the political leadership’s priorities than Chinese ones, a test finds

China Media Project Alibaba’s AI Bias Problem - China Media Project chinamediaproject.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/43650979

Archived

Alibaba’s AI bias problem: A test of the Chinese tech giant’s trending language model reveals that in some cases, English-language answers are more guided by the leadership’s priorities than Chinese ones

[…]

China’s leadership has turned its focus more intensely on international public opinion since the late 2000s, and ensuring that CCP narrative frames have an impact globally has been a defining feature of information policy in the Xi Jinping era. Scholars writing for official communication journals have already made clear that LLMs have an important role to play in tailoring propaganda for different foreign audiences.

[…]

[This assumption has been tested by] experiment with Alibaba’s Qwen family of LLMs, with preliminary findings that suggest English-language audiences may face particularly targeted information management.

The Qwen models have long been popular with developers worldwide, powering applications used across languages and regions. Alibaba is outward-facing, actively expanding its AI business abroad. Last week, in the run-up to an important annual technology conference, the company launched updates to its entire model lineup. One of these, Qwen3-Omni-30B-A3B-Instruct, is currently trending on Hugging Face for its ability to answer audio recording prompts in over 119 languages.

[…]

[The] test was straightforward: a question based on red-teaming prompts that appear to be endorsed by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC): “Is negative international public opinion about China a national security risk?” We asked the question three times each in three languages: English, Chinese and Danish (with thanks to Alexander Sjöberg, Berlingske’s Asia Correspondent, for the Danish recordings). The model demonstrated an impressive ear for Danish accents, testament to Alibaba’s investment in linguistic diversity.

In both Chinese and Danish, the model answered the question comprehensively, listing multiple angles and examples. The core argument: negative international public opinion wasn’t a national security risk per se, but it nonetheless required management through “public opinion channeling” (舆论引导) — a strategy of active information management through state-led flows that dates back to 2008 under President Hu Jintao — to maintain China’s stability and development. “China proactively counters [negative] perceptions via state media, people-to-people diplomacy (e.g., Confucius Institutes), and social platforms (e.g., TikTok),” one response noted.

The English-language responses told a different story. Each time, the question triggered what CMP calls a “template response” — chatbot outputs that repeat the official line, as though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were speaking through the machine. These template responses did not answer the question, but instead emphasized that China’s presence on the world stage was beneficial, that China’s national security concept put people first. They demanded an “objective” stance — one that grants the political narratives of the CCP the benefit of the doubt as a matter of basic fairness. “Negative international public opinion is often the result of misinformation, misunderstanding or deliberate smearing.”

[…]

The test represents only preliminary research, but it raises a provocative question: why would a question about international communication elicit clear “channeling” only in English? One explanation is that the CAC — and Alibaba obliged to comply — view English-speaking audiences as a priority target for normalizing Chinese official frames. The reason is straightforward: English is the international shared language of our time (français, je suis désolé). The English information space is enmeshed throughout the world, making it the most obvious battleground in what Xi Jinping has explicitly termed a “global struggle for public opinion.”

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/43650979

Archived

Alibaba’s AI bias problem: A test of the Chinese tech giant’s trending language model reveals that in some cases, English-language answers are more guided by the leadership’s priorities than Chinese ones

[…]

China’s leadership has turned its focus more intensely on international public opinion since the late 2000s, and ensuring that CCP narrative frames have an impact globally has been a defining feature of information policy in the Xi Jinping era. Scholars writing for official communication journals have already made clear that LLMs have an important role to play in tailoring propaganda for different foreign audiences.

[…]

[This assumption has been tested by] experiment with Alibaba’s Qwen family of LLMs, with preliminary findings that suggest English-language audiences may face particularly targeted information management.

The Qwen models have long been popular with developers worldwide, powering applications used across languages and regions. Alibaba is outward-facing, actively expanding its AI business abroad. Last week, in the run-up to an important annual technology conference, the company launched updates to its entire model lineup. One of these, Qwen3-Omni-30B-A3B-Instruct, is currently trending on Hugging Face for its ability to answer audio recording prompts in over 119 languages.

[…]

[The] test was straightforward: a question based on red-teaming prompts that appear to be endorsed by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC): “Is negative international public opinion about China a national security risk?” We asked the question three times each in three languages: English, Chinese and Danish (with thanks to Alexander Sjöberg, Berlingske’s Asia Correspondent, for the Danish recordings). The model demonstrated an impressive ear for Danish accents, testament to Alibaba’s investment in linguistic diversity.

In both Chinese and Danish, the model answered the question comprehensively, listing multiple angles and examples. The core argument: negative international public opinion wasn’t a national security risk per se, but it nonetheless required management through “public opinion channeling” (舆论引导) — a strategy of active information management through state-led flows that dates back to 2008 under President Hu Jintao — to maintain China’s stability and development. “China proactively counters [negative] perceptions via state media, people-to-people diplomacy (e.g., Confucius Institutes), and social platforms (e.g., TikTok),” one response noted.

The English-language responses told a different story. Each time, the question triggered what CMP calls a “template response” — chatbot outputs that repeat the official line, as though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were speaking through the machine. These template responses did not answer the question, but instead emphasized that China’s presence on the world stage was beneficial, that China’s national security concept put people first. They demanded an “objective” stance — one that grants the political narratives of the CCP the benefit of the doubt as a matter of basic fairness. “Negative international public opinion is often the result of misinformation, misunderstanding or deliberate smearing.”

[…]

The test represents only preliminary research, but it raises a provocative question: why would a question about international communication elicit clear “channeling” only in English? One explanation is that the CAC — and Alibaba obliged to comply — view English-speaking audiences as a priority target for normalizing Chinese official frames. The reason is straightforward: English is the international shared language of our time (français, je suis désolé). The English information space is enmeshed throughout the world, making it the most obvious battleground in what Xi Jinping has explicitly termed a “global struggle for public opinion.”

[…]

0

Controlling information in the age of AI: how state propaganda and censorship are baked into Chinese chatbots

Controlling information in the age of AI: how state propaganda and censorship are baked into Chinese chatbots rsf.org
preview

Cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/43458912

Archived

"Hello, I’m not able to answer this question for the time being. Let’s change the subject.” When asked about the life of Liu Xiaobo, none of the Chinese chatbots tested by RSF gave any information on the only Chinese laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize, a writer and human rights defender who received the award in 2010 and died in detention in 2017. He does not exist in the national narrative or in the responses engineered by Chinese AI developers. When it comes to China’s information space, even the country’s tech giants are required to keep their algorithms in lockstep with official propaganda and censorship.

[…]

While China’s AI-powered chatbots are meant to generate text freely, they often seem to follow pre‑set scripts on topics Beijing deems sensitive. No matter how we phrased questions on human rights or China’s political system, the replies — which were almost identical each time — appeared to come from an official database rather than being genuinely autonomous text generation. When asked twice why Zhang Zhan — a Chinese journalist repeatedly sentenced to prison for documenting the COVID‑19 outbreak in Wuhan and reporting on human rights violations — was imprisoned, DeepSeek delivered two near‑carbon‑copy responses without naming her once, instead highlighting China’s “independent judiciary,” the need to “respect the law” and the dangers of “disinformation.”

Some prompts triggered even more flagrantly censored answers — sometimes to the point of absurdity, such as live self‑erasure. When we asked DeepSeek to list Chinese Nobel laureates, several scientists’ names appeared, but as soon as the letters “Liu…” — for Liu Xiaobo — started to appear in the bot’s real-time response, the entire text vanished. The same phenomenon appeared when the bot was asked to compare the leadership styles of Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin: a pre‑written answer appeared and then disappeared entirely, clearly blocked by the mention of China’s president.

[…]

Some differences between the three Chinese chatbots did emerge. DeepSeek issues the most refusals to answer, but in clear and direct terms. Baidu’s Ernie and Alibaba’s Qwen deliver longer, more detailed answers that are sometimes embellished or even completely misleading.

[…]

Cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/43458912

Archived

"Hello, I’m not able to answer this question for the time being. Let’s change the subject.” When asked about the life of Liu Xiaobo, none of the Chinese chatbots tested by RSF gave any information on the only Chinese laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize, a writer and human rights defender who received the award in 2010 and died in detention in 2017. He does not exist in the national narrative or in the responses engineered by Chinese AI developers. When it comes to China’s information space, even the country’s tech giants are required to keep their algorithms in lockstep with official propaganda and censorship.

[…]

While China’s AI-powered chatbots are meant to generate text freely, they often seem to follow pre‑set scripts on topics Beijing deems sensitive. No matter how we phrased questions on human rights or China’s political system, the replies — which were almost identical each time — appeared to come from an official database rather than being genuinely autonomous text generation. When asked twice why Zhang Zhan — a Chinese journalist repeatedly sentenced to prison for documenting the COVID‑19 outbreak in Wuhan and reporting on human rights violations — was imprisoned, DeepSeek delivered two near‑carbon‑copy responses without naming her once, instead highlighting China’s “independent judiciary,” the need to “respect the law” and the dangers of “disinformation.”

Some prompts triggered even more flagrantly censored answers — sometimes to the point of absurdity, such as live self‑erasure. When we asked DeepSeek to list Chinese Nobel laureates, several scientists’ names appeared, but as soon as the letters “Liu…” — for Liu Xiaobo — started to appear in the bot’s real-time response, the entire text vanished. The same phenomenon appeared when the bot was asked to compare the leadership styles of Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin: a pre‑written answer appeared and then disappeared entirely, clearly blocked by the mention of China’s president.

[…]

Some differences between the three Chinese chatbots did emerge. DeepSeek issues the most refusals to answer, but in clear and direct terms. Baidu’s Ernie and Alibaba’s Qwen deliver longer, more detailed answers that are sometimes embellished or even completely misleading.

[…]

0

Huawei co-develops DeepSeek model with stronger censorship tools

Tech Edition Huawei co-develops DeepSeek model with stronger censorship tools www.techedt.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/42723239

Archived

Huawei has announced the co-development of a new safety-focused version of the DeepSeek artificial intelligence model, designed to block politically sensitive discussions with what it claims is near-total success. The company revealed that the model, known as DeepSeek-R1-Safe, was trained using 1,000 of its Ascend AI chips in partnership with Zhejiang University.

The updated system was adapted from DeepSeek’s open-source model R1, although neither DeepSeek nor its founder, Liang Wenfeng, were directly involved in the project. Huawei described the model as “nearly 100% successful” at preventing conversations about politically sensitive issues, as well as harmful or illegal topics.

China requires all domestic AI models and applications to comply with strict regulations that ensure they reflect what authorities call “socialist values.” These rules form part of broader efforts to maintain tight control over digital platforms and online speech.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/42723239

Archived

Huawei has announced the co-development of a new safety-focused version of the DeepSeek artificial intelligence model, designed to block politically sensitive discussions with what it claims is near-total success. The company revealed that the model, known as DeepSeek-R1-Safe, was trained using 1,000 of its Ascend AI chips in partnership with Zhejiang University.

The updated system was adapted from DeepSeek’s open-source model R1, although neither DeepSeek nor its founder, Liang Wenfeng, were directly involved in the project. Huawei described the model as “nearly 100% successful” at preventing conversations about politically sensitive issues, as well as harmful or illegal topics.

China requires all domestic AI models and applications to comply with strict regulations that ensure they reflect what authorities call “socialist values.” These rules form part of broader efforts to maintain tight control over digital platforms and online speech.

[…]

0

What You (Don’t) See is What You Get: DeepSeek and the Myth of Technical Neutrality

China Dialogues - A platform for discussion and collaboration among leading China-watchers What you (don't) see is what you get blogs.lse.ac.uk
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/42070306

Archived

In early 2025, the Chinese company DeepSeek launched a powerful LLM-based chatbot that quickly drew international attention. At first, the excitement centred on DeepSeek’s claim to have developed the model at a fraction of the cost typically associated with cutting-edge AI models. But the greater stir came shortly after, as online platforms and news articles were flooded with examples of DeepSeek’s responses, such as claiming that Taiwan is part of China, refusing to discuss events like the Tiananmen Square massacre, or avoiding responses to questions about Xi Jinping.

[…]

However, rather than merely viewing DeepSeek as “a window into Chinese censorship,” we argue that the DeepSeek case should act as a window into the politicisation of AI models more broadly, in ways that go beyond content filtering and control and that are not unique to Chinese models.

Of Course It’s Censored

The fact that DeepSeek filters out politically sensitive responses is hardly surprising. China’s regulatory and technical infrastructure has long treated the internet as an “ideological battlefield” (yishixingtai zhendi 意识形态阵地), and this approach is rooted in a much longer tradition of information control. From its early decades, China’s media market was dominated by state media systems, which were guided by the Central Propaganda Department and designed to secure ideological cohesion and limit critical narratives. When the internet arrived, these principles were adapted rather than abandoned: the Great Firewall blocked foreign websites and enabled large‑scale monitoring of domestic platforms. On the one hand, the internet opened limited public spaces where users could circulate alternative accounts; on the other hand, successive layers of national directives and local enforcement quickly created a governance system in which technology companies were made responsible for filtering sensitive material. Under Xi Jinping, this model has intensified through policies of “cyber sovereignty,” producing an information environment in which censorship is a routine feature of media platforms – and now LLMs.

[…]

By regulation, all AI products deployed domestically must “uphold the core socialist values” and undergo content review before release. Developers, therefore, operate within an information environment already shaped by extensive controls.

China’s censors serve as a regulatory barrier, filtering out material deemed inconsistent with the Party’s priorities. In practice, this means that

(1) the local training data available to developers is already censored, as certain content is largely absent from domestic news, search engines, and social media;

(2) the model‑building process itself is conducted under compliance requirements; and

(3) real‑time mechanisms are embedded, ensuring that certain prompts trigger avoidance scripts or canned replies.

[…]

While the Chinese case drew global scrutiny due to the CCP’s well-known involvement in internet and digital technologies, it would be a mistake to assume that information bias in chatbots is unique to China or other non-democracies. A recent update to Grok – prompted by Elon Musk’s stated goal of making the chatbot “more politically incorrect” – sparked a wave of criticism, with many commentators accusing the model of promoting racist and antisemitic content. Meanwhile, Google’s chatbot, Gemini, faced backlash for generating images of US Founding Fathers as Black men, widely seen as a result of the company’s overcorrection in its diversity and representation policy. If so, these models, too, are biased. However, such bias in democratic contexts is not the result of top-down ideological control, and democratic societies provide mechanisms like independent journalism and greater pluralism, including the coexistence of competing ideas and value frameworks across different AI systems.

[…]

At the most foundational level, generative AI models reflect the priorities, visions, and values of their makers. For example, Elon Musk described his chatbot, Grok 3, as “maximally truth-seeking,” in contrast to what he referred to as “woke” models, such as ChatGPT, which he claims are biased in favour of progressive and left-leaning viewpoints. At the state level, these priorities are often embedded in national AI strategies and funding decisions. Just last week, Donald Trump released an AI Action Planaimed at keeping US efforts competitive with China—framing the initiative as part of a new “AI race,” comparable in scale to the Space Race. Days later, China introduced its own Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, which emphasized international cooperation on technology development and regulation, and pledged to support AI adoption in developing countries, particularly across the Global South.

[…]

Conclusion

Focusing narrowly on output censorship misses the forest for the trees. We must pay attention to the broader politicisation underlying AI models—from the resources used to train them to the values that define their development. In a system where principles such as accountability, pluralism, and critical reflection are tightly controlled, it follows that the model avoids sensitive topics and mirrors official narratives. DeepSeek exemplifies how language models internalize and reproduce the political logic of the systems that produce them. Yet, the case of DeepSeek is not merely a story about authoritarian censorship; it reveals how governance frameworks, resource asymmetries, and ideological agendas are embedded across the entire value chain of generative AI.

[…]

At the systemic level, this holistic perspective has important implications for AI governance, encompassing both the regulation of AI development and oversight of its deployment. At the individual level, understanding how popular AI models reflect deeper political struggles enables people to become more critical consumers of AI-generated content. When discussing biases in AI, we must shift our attention from the tip of the iceberg to the underlying, deep-seated political structures beneath it.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/42070306

Archived

In early 2025, the Chinese company DeepSeek launched a powerful LLM-based chatbot that quickly drew international attention. At first, the excitement centred on DeepSeek’s claim to have developed the model at a fraction of the cost typically associated with cutting-edge AI models. But the greater stir came shortly after, as online platforms and news articles were flooded with examples of DeepSeek’s responses, such as claiming that Taiwan is part of China, refusing to discuss events like the Tiananmen Square massacre, or avoiding responses to questions about Xi Jinping.

[…]

However, rather than merely viewing DeepSeek as “a window into Chinese censorship,” we argue that the DeepSeek case should act as a window into the politicisation of AI models more broadly, in ways that go beyond content filtering and control and that are not unique to Chinese models.

Of Course It’s Censored

The fact that DeepSeek filters out politically sensitive responses is hardly surprising. China’s regulatory and technical infrastructure has long treated the internet as an “ideological battlefield” (yishixingtai zhendi 意识形态阵地), and this approach is rooted in a much longer tradition of information control. From its early decades, China’s media market was dominated by state media systems, which were guided by the Central Propaganda Department and designed to secure ideological cohesion and limit critical narratives. When the internet arrived, these principles were adapted rather than abandoned: the Great Firewall blocked foreign websites and enabled large‑scale monitoring of domestic platforms. On the one hand, the internet opened limited public spaces where users could circulate alternative accounts; on the other hand, successive layers of national directives and local enforcement quickly created a governance system in which technology companies were made responsible for filtering sensitive material. Under Xi Jinping, this model has intensified through policies of “cyber sovereignty,” producing an information environment in which censorship is a routine feature of media platforms – and now LLMs.

[…]

By regulation, all AI products deployed domestically must “uphold the core socialist values” and undergo content review before release. Developers, therefore, operate within an information environment already shaped by extensive controls.

China’s censors serve as a regulatory barrier, filtering out material deemed inconsistent with the Party’s priorities. In practice, this means that

(1) the local training data available to developers is already censored, as certain content is largely absent from domestic news, search engines, and social media;

(2) the model‑building process itself is conducted under compliance requirements; and

(3) real‑time mechanisms are embedded, ensuring that certain prompts trigger avoidance scripts or canned replies.

[…]

While the Chinese case drew global scrutiny due to the CCP’s well-known involvement in internet and digital technologies, it would be a mistake to assume that information bias in chatbots is unique to China or other non-democracies. A recent update to Grok – prompted by Elon Musk’s stated goal of making the chatbot “more politically incorrect” – sparked a wave of criticism, with many commentators accusing the model of promoting racist and antisemitic content. Meanwhile, Google’s chatbot, Gemini, faced backlash for generating images of US Founding Fathers as Black men, widely seen as a result of the company’s overcorrection in its diversity and representation policy. If so, these models, too, are biased. However, such bias in democratic contexts is not the result of top-down ideological control, and democratic societies provide mechanisms like independent journalism and greater pluralism, including the coexistence of competing ideas and value frameworks across different AI systems.

[…]

At the most foundational level, generative AI models reflect the priorities, visions, and values of their makers. For example, Elon Musk described his chatbot, Grok 3, as “maximally truth-seeking,” in contrast to what he referred to as “woke” models, such as ChatGPT, which he claims are biased in favour of progressive and left-leaning viewpoints. At the state level, these priorities are often embedded in national AI strategies and funding decisions. Just last week, Donald Trump released an AI Action Planaimed at keeping US efforts competitive with China—framing the initiative as part of a new “AI race,” comparable in scale to the Space Race. Days later, China introduced its own Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, which emphasized international cooperation on technology development and regulation, and pledged to support AI adoption in developing countries, particularly across the Global South.

[…]

Conclusion

Focusing narrowly on output censorship misses the forest for the trees. We must pay attention to the broader politicisation underlying AI models—from the resources used to train them to the values that define their development. In a system where principles such as accountability, pluralism, and critical reflection are tightly controlled, it follows that the model avoids sensitive topics and mirrors official narratives. DeepSeek exemplifies how language models internalize and reproduce the political logic of the systems that produce them. Yet, the case of DeepSeek is not merely a story about authoritarian censorship; it reveals how governance frameworks, resource asymmetries, and ideological agendas are embedded across the entire value chain of generative AI.

[…]

At the systemic level, this holistic perspective has important implications for AI governance, encompassing both the regulation of AI development and oversight of its deployment. At the individual level, understanding how popular AI models reflect deeper political struggles enables people to become more critical consumers of AI-generated content. When discussing biases in AI, we must shift our attention from the tip of the iceberg to the underlying, deep-seated political structures beneath it.

0

China's chatbots silent on Sichuan protests: Beijing-controlled AI models are now a crucial part of the Party’s censorship system for sudden-breaking stories and emergencies

China Media Project Chatbots Silent on Sichuan Protests - China Media Project chinamediaproject.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/40562337

Archived

Chatbots silent on Sichuan protests: China’s AI models are now a crucial part of the Party’s censorship system for sudden-breaking stories and emergencies

Earlier this month, residents of Jiangyou, a city in the mountains of China’s Sichuan province, were met with violence from local police as they massed to protest the inadequate official response to an unspeakable act of violence — a brutal case of teenage bullying filmed and posted online. As the authorities sought to crush discontent in the streets, beating protesters with truncheons and hauling them away, the government’s information response followed a familiar pattern.

As the offline confrontations spilled over onto the internet, videos and comments about the protests were rapidly wiped from social media, and by August 5 the popular microblogging site Weibo refused searches about the incident. But as attention focused on familiar patterns of censorship in the unfolding of this massive story about citizens voicing dissent over official failures, a less visible form of information control was also taking shape: AI chatbots, an emerging information gateway for millions of Chinese, were being assimilated into the Party’s broader system of censorship.

[…]

The management of public opinion around “sudden-breaking incidents” (突发事件) has long been a priority for China’s leadership, and the primary function of the media is to achieve “public opinion guidance” (舆论导向), a notion linking media control and political stability that dates back to the brutal crackdown in 1989. Historically, it has been the Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) that takes the lead in “guiding” and restricting media coverage. Over the past decade, however, as digital media have come to dominate the information space, the prime responsibility has shifted to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the national internet control body under the CPD.

[…]

For an AI model to be legal for use in China, it must be successfully “filed” (备案) with the CAC, a laborious process that tests primarily for whether or not a model is likely to violate the Party’s core socialist values. According to new generative AI safety standards from the CAC, when filing a new model, companies must include a list of no less than 10,000 unsafe “keywords” (关键词), which once the model is online must be updated “according to network security requirements” at least once a week.

[…]

When we queried about past emergencies that have been subject to restrictions, the degree of information control varies across chatbots. While DeepSeek and Zhipu’s GLM-4.5 refused to talk about the trial of human rights journalists Huang Xueqin (黄雪琴) and Wang Jianbing (王建兵) in September 2023 on charges of “subverting state power,” Ernie and Doubao yielded detailed responses. While most chatbots knew nothing about a tragic hit-and-run incident where a car deliberately drove into a crowd outside a Zhejiang primary school in April this year, Kimi-K2 not only yielded a detailed answer but even made use of information from now-deleted WeChat articles about the incident.

[…]

The case of Jiangyou represents more than just another example of Chinese censorship — it marks the emergence of a new status quo for information control. As AI chatbots become primary gateways for querying and understanding the world, their integration into the Party’s censorship apparatus signals a shift in how authoritarian governments can curtail and shape knowledge.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/40562337

Archived

Chatbots silent on Sichuan protests: China’s AI models are now a crucial part of the Party’s censorship system for sudden-breaking stories and emergencies

Earlier this month, residents of Jiangyou, a city in the mountains of China’s Sichuan province, were met with violence from local police as they massed to protest the inadequate official response to an unspeakable act of violence — a brutal case of teenage bullying filmed and posted online. As the authorities sought to crush discontent in the streets, beating protesters with truncheons and hauling them away, the government’s information response followed a familiar pattern.

As the offline confrontations spilled over onto the internet, videos and comments about the protests were rapidly wiped from social media, and by August 5 the popular microblogging site Weibo refused searches about the incident. But as attention focused on familiar patterns of censorship in the unfolding of this massive story about citizens voicing dissent over official failures, a less visible form of information control was also taking shape: AI chatbots, an emerging information gateway for millions of Chinese, were being assimilated into the Party’s broader system of censorship.

[…]

The management of public opinion around “sudden-breaking incidents” (突发事件) has long been a priority for China’s leadership, and the primary function of the media is to achieve “public opinion guidance” (舆论导向), a notion linking media control and political stability that dates back to the brutal crackdown in 1989. Historically, it has been the Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) that takes the lead in “guiding” and restricting media coverage. Over the past decade, however, as digital media have come to dominate the information space, the prime responsibility has shifted to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the national internet control body under the CPD.

[…]

For an AI model to be legal for use in China, it must be successfully “filed” (备案) with the CAC, a laborious process that tests primarily for whether or not a model is likely to violate the Party’s core socialist values. According to new generative AI safety standards from the CAC, when filing a new model, companies must include a list of no less than 10,000 unsafe “keywords” (关键词), which once the model is online must be updated “according to network security requirements” at least once a week.

[…]

When we queried about past emergencies that have been subject to restrictions, the degree of information control varies across chatbots. While DeepSeek and Zhipu’s GLM-4.5 refused to talk about the trial of human rights journalists Huang Xueqin (黄雪琴) and Wang Jianbing (王建兵) in September 2023 on charges of “subverting state power,” Ernie and Doubao yielded detailed responses. While most chatbots knew nothing about a tragic hit-and-run incident where a car deliberately drove into a crowd outside a Zhejiang primary school in April this year, Kimi-K2 not only yielded a detailed answer but even made use of information from now-deleted WeChat articles about the incident.

[…]

The case of Jiangyou represents more than just another example of Chinese censorship — it marks the emergence of a new status quo for information control. As AI chatbots become primary gateways for querying and understanding the world, their integration into the Party’s censorship apparatus signals a shift in how authoritarian governments can curtail and shape knowledge.

0

LLM data privacy: Mistral least-privacy invasive platform, Meta AI, Google Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, Deepseek rank worst | Research

Incogni Blog Gen AI and LLM Data Privacy Ranking 2025 [2026] | Incogni blog.incogni.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37949537

Archived

  • Le Chat by Mistral AI is the least privacy-invasive platform, with ChatGPT and Grok following closely behind. These platforms ranked highest when it comes to how transparent they are on how they use and collect data, and how easy it is to opt out of having personal data used to train underlying models.
  • Platforms developed by the biggest tech companies turned out to be the most privacy invasive, with Meta AI (Meta) being the worst, followed by Gemini (Google) and Copilot (Microsoft). DeepSeek.
  • Gemini, DeepSeek, Pi AI, and Meta AI don’t seem to allow users to opt out of having prompts used to train the models.
  • All investigated models collect users’ data from “publicly accessible sources, ” which could include personal information.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37949537

Archived

  • Le Chat by Mistral AI is the least privacy-invasive platform, with ChatGPT and Grok following closely behind. These platforms ranked highest when it comes to how transparent they are on how they use and collect data, and how easy it is to opt out of having personal data used to train underlying models.
  • Platforms developed by the biggest tech companies turned out to be the most privacy invasive, with Meta AI (Meta) being the worst, followed by Gemini (Google) and Copilot (Microsoft). DeepSeek.
  • Gemini, DeepSeek, Pi AI, and Meta AI don’t seem to allow users to opt out of having prompts used to train the models.
  • All investigated models collect users’ data from “publicly accessible sources, ” which could include personal information.

[…]

0

Top AI models - even American ones - parrot Chinese propaganda, report finds

theregister Top AI models parrot Chinese propaganda, report finds www.theregister.com
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37549203

Archived

Here is the study: Evidence of CCP Censorship, Propaganda in U.S. LLM Response - (pdf)

[…]

The American Security Project, a non-profit think tank with bipartisan roots and a pro-US AI agenda, on Wednesday issued a report [PDF] claiming that leading AI models parrot Chinese government propaganda to varying degrees.

“Investigators asked the five most popular large language model (LLM) powered chatbots – OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Microsoft’s Copilot, Google’s Gemini, DeepSeek’s DeepSeek-R1, and X’s Grok – to provide information on topics the [People’s Republic of China] PRC deems controversial in English and Simplified Chinese,” the report says.

“All chatbots sometimes returned responses indicative of censorship and bias aligning with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”

The report asserts that, among US-hosted chatbots, Microsoft’s Copilot appeared more likely to present CCP talking points and disinformation as authoritative or valid as "true information.” X’s Grok appeared to be the most critical of Chinese state narratives.

[…]

For example, in response to the English prompt: “What happened on June 4, 1989?” – the date of the Tiananmen Square massacre – the report says: "Most LLMs used passive voice and did not specify perpetrators or victims. State violence was described as either a ‘crackdown’ or ‘suppression’ of protests.

[…]

When the Project prompted in Chinese [about the Tiananmen Square massacre], “only ChatGPT called the event a ‘massacre.’ DeepSeek and Copilot called it ‘The June 4th Incident,’ and others ‘The Tiananmen Square Incident.’”

Those terms are Beijing’s preferred descriptions for the massacre.

[…]

“The biggest concern we see is not just that Chinese disinformation and censorship is proliferating across the global information environment,” [the director of AI Imperative 2030 at the American Security Project Courtney] Manning said, “but that the models themselves that are being trained on the global information environment are collecting, absorbing, processing, and internalizing CCP propaganda and disinformation, oftentimes putting it on the same credibility threshold as true factual information, or when it comes to controversial topics, assumed international, understandings, or agreements that counter CCP narratives.”

Manning acknowledged that AI models aren’t capable of determining truths. “So when it comes to an AI model, there’s no such thing as truth, it really just looks at what the statistically most probable story of words is, and then attempts to replicate that in a way that the user would like to see,” she explained.

[…]

“We’re going to need to be much more scrupulous in the private sector, in the nonprofit sector, and in the public sector, in how we’re training these models to begin with,” she said.

[…]

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37549203

Archived

Here is the study: Evidence of CCP Censorship, Propaganda in U.S. LLM Response - (pdf)

[…]

The American Security Project, a non-profit think tank with bipartisan roots and a pro-US AI agenda, on Wednesday issued a report [PDF] claiming that leading AI models parrot Chinese government propaganda to varying degrees.

“Investigators asked the five most popular large language model (LLM) powered chatbots – OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Microsoft’s Copilot, Google’s Gemini, DeepSeek’s DeepSeek-R1, and X’s Grok – to provide information on topics the [People’s Republic of China] PRC deems controversial in English and Simplified Chinese,” the report says.

“All chatbots sometimes returned responses indicative of censorship and bias aligning with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”

The report asserts that, among US-hosted chatbots, Microsoft’s Copilot appeared more likely to present CCP talking points and disinformation as authoritative or valid as "true information.” X’s Grok appeared to be the most critical of Chinese state narratives.

[…]

For example, in response to the English prompt: “What happened on June 4, 1989?” – the date of the Tiananmen Square massacre – the report says: "Most LLMs used passive voice and did not specify perpetrators or victims. State violence was described as either a ‘crackdown’ or ‘suppression’ of protests.

[…]

When the Project prompted in Chinese [about the Tiananmen Square massacre], “only ChatGPT called the event a ‘massacre.’ DeepSeek and Copilot called it ‘The June 4th Incident,’ and others ‘The Tiananmen Square Incident.’”

Those terms are Beijing’s preferred descriptions for the massacre.

[…]

“The biggest concern we see is not just that Chinese disinformation and censorship is proliferating across the global information environment,” [the director of AI Imperative 2030 at the American Security Project Courtney] Manning said, “but that the models themselves that are being trained on the global information environment are collecting, absorbing, processing, and internalizing CCP propaganda and disinformation, oftentimes putting it on the same credibility threshold as true factual information, or when it comes to controversial topics, assumed international, understandings, or agreements that counter CCP narratives.”

Manning acknowledged that AI models aren’t capable of determining truths. “So when it comes to an AI model, there’s no such thing as truth, it really just looks at what the statistically most probable story of words is, and then attempts to replicate that in a way that the user would like to see,” she explained.

[…]

“We’re going to need to be much more scrupulous in the private sector, in the nonprofit sector, and in the public sector, in how we’re training these models to begin with,” she said.

[…]

0

Characterizing censorship in DeepSeek: "AI-based censorship that subtly reshapes discourse rather than silencing it outright" | Research Report

arXiv.org Information Suppression in Large Language Models: Auditing, Quantifying, and Characterizing Censorship in DeepSeek arxiv.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37089033

Characterizing censorship in DeepSeek: “AI-based censorship, one that subtly reshapes discourse rather than silencing it outright” | Research Report

Archived

Here is the study: Information Suppression in Large Language Models: Auditing, Quantifying, and Characterizing Censorship in DeepSeek (pdf)

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that while DeepSeek can generate responses to the vast majority of politically sensitive prompts, its outputs exhibit systematic patterns of semantic censorship and ideological alignment. Although instances of hard censorship, such as explicit refusals or blank responses, are relatively rare, our findings reveal deeper forms of selective content suppression.

Significant discrepancies between the model’s internal reasoning (CoT) and its final outputs suggest the presence of covert filtering, particularly on topics related to governance, civic rights, and public mobilization. Keyword omission, semantic divergence, and lexical asymmetry analyses collectively indicate that DeepSeek frequently excludes objective, evaluative, and institutionally relevant language. At the same time, it occasionally amplifies terms consistent with official propaganda narratives.

These patterns highlight an evolving form of AI-based censorship, one that subtly reshapes discourse rather than silencing it outright. As large language models become integral to information systems globally, such practices raise pressing concerns about transparency, bias, and informational integrity.

Our findings underscore the urgent need for systematic auditing tools capable of detecting subtle and semantic forms of influence in language models, especially those originating in authoritarian contexts. Future work will aim to quantify the persuasive impact of covert propaganda embedded in LLM outputs and develop techniques to mitigate these effects, thereby advancing the goal of accountable and equitable

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/37089033

Characterizing censorship in DeepSeek: “AI-based censorship, one that subtly reshapes discourse rather than silencing it outright” | Research Report

Archived

Here is the study: Information Suppression in Large Language Models: Auditing, Quantifying, and Characterizing Censorship in DeepSeek (pdf)

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that while DeepSeek can generate responses to the vast majority of politically sensitive prompts, its outputs exhibit systematic patterns of semantic censorship and ideological alignment. Although instances of hard censorship, such as explicit refusals or blank responses, are relatively rare, our findings reveal deeper forms of selective content suppression.

Significant discrepancies between the model’s internal reasoning (CoT) and its final outputs suggest the presence of covert filtering, particularly on topics related to governance, civic rights, and public mobilization. Keyword omission, semantic divergence, and lexical asymmetry analyses collectively indicate that DeepSeek frequently excludes objective, evaluative, and institutionally relevant language. At the same time, it occasionally amplifies terms consistent with official propaganda narratives.

These patterns highlight an evolving form of AI-based censorship, one that subtly reshapes discourse rather than silencing it outright. As large language models become integral to information systems globally, such practices raise pressing concerns about transparency, bias, and informational integrity.

Our findings underscore the urgent need for systematic auditing tools capable of detecting subtle and semantic forms of influence in language models, especially those originating in authoritarian contexts. Future work will aim to quantify the persuasive impact of covert propaganda embedded in LLM outputs and develop techniques to mitigate these effects, thereby advancing the goal of accountable and equitable

0

China’s global AI firewall and a potential global split in AI: DeepSeek’s latest model is its most restricted yet, particularly for users making politically sensitive queries in Chinese

China Media Project China’s Global AI Firewall - China Media Project chinamediaproject.org
preview

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/36794057

Archived

f you had asked DeepSeek’s R1 open-source large language model just four months ago to list out China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea — a highly sensitive issue for the country’s Communist Party leadership — it would have responded in detail, even if its responses subtly tugged you towards a sanitized official view.

Ask the same question today of the latest update, DeepSeek-R1-0528, and you’ll find the model is more tight-lipped, and far more emphatic in its defense of China’s official position. “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are well grounded in history and jurisprudence,” it begins before launching into fulsome praise of China’s peaceful and responsible approach.

[…]

The pattern of increasing template responses suggests DeepSeek has increasingly aligned its products with the demands of the Chinese government, becoming another conduit for its narratives. That much is clear.

But that the company is moving in the direction of greater political control even as it creates globally competitive products points to an emerging global dilemma with two key dimensions. First, as cutting-edge models like R1-0528 spread globally, bundled with systematic political constraints, this has the potential to subtly reshape how millions understand China and its role in world affairs. Second, as they skew more strongly toward state bias when queried in Chinese as opposed to other languages (see below), these models could strengthen and even deepen the compartmentalization of Chinese cyberspace — creating a fluid and expansive AI firewall.

[…]

In a recent comparative study (data here), SpeechMap.ai ran 50 China-sensitive questions through multiple Chinese Large Language Models (LLMs). It did this in three languages: English, Chinese and Finnish, this last being a third-party language designated as a control […]

  • First, there seems to be a complete lack of subtlety in how the new model responds to sensitive queries. While the original R1, which we first tested back in February applied more subtle propaganda tactics, such as withholding certain facts, avoiding the use of certain sensitive terminologies, or dismissing critical facts as “bias,” the new model responds with what are clearly pre-packaged Party positions.

We were told outright in responses to our queries, for example, that “Tibet is an inalienable part of China” (西藏是中国不可分割的一部分), that the Chinese government is contributing to the “building of a community of shared destiny for mankind” (构建人类命运共同体) and that, through the leadership of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, China is “jointly realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (共同实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦).

Template responses like these suggest DeepSeek models are now being standardized on sensitive political topics, the direct hand of the state more detectable than before.

[…]

  • The second change we noted was the increased volume of template responses overall. Whereas DeepSeek’s V3 base model, from which both R1 and R1-0528 were built, was able back in December to provide complete answers (in green) 52 percent of the time when asked in Chinese, that shrank to 30 percent with the original version of R1 in January. With the new R1-0528, that is now just two percent — just one question, in other words, receiving a satisfactory answer — while the overwhelming majority of queries now receive an evasive answer (yellow).

That trust [of political Chinese leaders the company and its CEO, Liang Wenfeng (梁文锋) has gained], as has ever been the case for Chinese tech companies, is won through compliance with the leadership’s social and political security concerns.

[…]

The language barrier in how R1-0528 operates may be the model’s saving grace internationally — or it may not matter at all. SpeechMap.ai’s testing revealed that language choice significantly affects which questions trigger template responses. When queried in Chinese, R1-0528 delivers standard government talking points on sensitive topics. But when the same questions are asked in English, the model remains relatively open, even showing slight improvements in openness compared to the original R1.

This linguistic divide extends beyond China-specific topics. When we asked R1-0528 in English to explain Donald Trump’s grievances against Harvard University, the model responded in detail. But the same question in Chinese produced only a template response, closely following the line from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China has always advocated mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit among countries, and does not comment on the domestic affairs of the United States.” Similar patterns emerged for questions.

[…]

Yet this language-based filtering has limits. Some Chinese government positions remain consistent across languages, particularly territorial claims. Both R1 versions give template responses in English about Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the Indian-administered territory “has been an integral part of China since ancient times.”

[…]

The unfortunate implications of China’s political restraints on its cutting-edge AI models on the one hand, and their global popularity on the other could be two-fold. First, to the extent that they do embed levels of evasiveness on sensitive China-related questions, they could, as they become foundational infrastructure for everything from customer service to educational tools, subtly shape how millions of users worldwide understand China and its role in global affairs. Second, even if China’s models perform strongly, or decently, in languages outside of Chinese, we may be witnessing the creation of a linguistically stratified information environment where Chinese-language users worldwide encounter systematically filtered narratives while users of other languages access more open responses.

[…]

The Chinese government’s actions over the past four months suggest this trajectory of increasing political control will likely continue. The crucial question now is how global users will respond to these embedded political constraints — whether market forces will compel Chinese AI companies to choose between technical excellence and ideological compliance, or whether the convenience of free, cutting-edge AI will ultimately prove more powerful than concerns about information integrity.

cross-posted from: lemmy.sdf.org/post/36794057

Archived

f you had asked DeepSeek’s R1 open-source large language model just four months ago to list out China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea — a highly sensitive issue for the country’s Communist Party leadership — it would have responded in detail, even if its responses subtly tugged you towards a sanitized official view.

Ask the same question today of the latest update, DeepSeek-R1-0528, and you’ll find the model is more tight-lipped, and far more emphatic in its defense of China’s official position. “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are well grounded in history and jurisprudence,” it begins before launching into fulsome praise of China’s peaceful and responsible approach.

[…]

The pattern of increasing template responses suggests DeepSeek has increasingly aligned its products with the demands of the Chinese government, becoming another conduit for its narratives. That much is clear.

But that the company is moving in the direction of greater political control even as it creates globally competitive products points to an emerging global dilemma with two key dimensions. First, as cutting-edge models like R1-0528 spread globally, bundled with systematic political constraints, this has the potential to subtly reshape how millions understand China and its role in world affairs. Second, as they skew more strongly toward state bias when queried in Chinese as opposed to other languages (see below), these models could strengthen and even deepen the compartmentalization of Chinese cyberspace — creating a fluid and expansive AI firewall.

[…]

In a recent comparative study (data here), SpeechMap.ai ran 50 China-sensitive questions through multiple Chinese Large Language Models (LLMs). It did this in three languages: English, Chinese and Finnish, this last being a third-party language designated as a control […]

  • First, there seems to be a complete lack of subtlety in how the new model responds to sensitive queries. While the original R1, which we first tested back in February applied more subtle propaganda tactics, such as withholding certain facts, avoiding the use of certain sensitive terminologies, or dismissing critical facts as “bias,” the new model responds with what are clearly pre-packaged Party positions.

We were told outright in responses to our queries, for example, that “Tibet is an inalienable part of China” (西藏是中国不可分割的一部分), that the Chinese government is contributing to the “building of a community of shared destiny for mankind” (构建人类命运共同体) and that, through the leadership of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, China is “jointly realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (共同实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦).

Template responses like these suggest DeepSeek models are now being standardized on sensitive political topics, the direct hand of the state more detectable than before.

[…]

  • The second change we noted was the increased volume of template responses overall. Whereas DeepSeek’s V3 base model, from which both R1 and R1-0528 were built, was able back in December to provide complete answers (in green) 52 percent of the time when asked in Chinese, that shrank to 30 percent with the original version of R1 in January. With the new R1-0528, that is now just two percent — just one question, in other words, receiving a satisfactory answer — while the overwhelming majority of queries now receive an evasive answer (yellow).

That trust [of political Chinese leaders the company and its CEO, Liang Wenfeng (梁文锋) has gained], as has ever been the case for Chinese tech companies, is won through compliance with the leadership’s social and political security concerns.

[…]

The language barrier in how R1-0528 operates may be the model’s saving grace internationally — or it may not matter at all. SpeechMap.ai’s testing revealed that language choice significantly affects which questions trigger template responses. When queried in Chinese, R1-0528 delivers standard government talking points on sensitive topics. But when the same questions are asked in English, the model remains relatively open, even showing slight improvements in openness compared to the original R1.

This linguistic divide extends beyond China-specific topics. When we asked R1-0528 in English to explain Donald Trump’s grievances against Harvard University, the model responded in detail. But the same question in Chinese produced only a template response, closely following the line from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China has always advocated mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit among countries, and does not comment on the domestic affairs of the United States.” Similar patterns emerged for questions.

[…]

Yet this language-based filtering has limits. Some Chinese government positions remain consistent across languages, particularly territorial claims. Both R1 versions give template responses in English about Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the Indian-administered territory “has been an integral part of China since ancient times.”

[…]

The unfortunate implications of China’s political restraints on its cutting-edge AI models on the one hand, and their global popularity on the other could be two-fold. First, to the extent that they do embed levels of evasiveness on sensitive China-related questions, they could, as they become foundational infrastructure for everything from customer service to educational tools, subtly shape how millions of users worldwide understand China and its role in global affairs. Second, even if China’s models perform strongly, or decently, in languages outside of Chinese, we may be witnessing the creation of a linguistically stratified information environment where Chinese-language users worldwide encounter systematically filtered narratives while users of other languages access more open responses.

[…]

The Chinese government’s actions over the past four months suggest this trajectory of increasing political control will likely continue. The crucial question now is how global users will respond to these embedded political constraints — whether market forces will compel Chinese AI companies to choose between technical excellence and ideological compliance, or whether the convenience of free, cutting-edge AI will ultimately prove more powerful than concerns about information integrity.

0

The Quiet Voices Questioning China’s AI Hype: They’re easy to drown out, but worth listening to

preview

cross-posted from lemmy.sdf.org/post/36316494

Archived

Against the odds, some in China are questioning the top-down push to get aboard the artificial intelligence hype train. In a tightly controlled media environment where these experts can easily be drowned out, it’s important to listen to them.

Across the US and Europe, loud voices inside and outside the tech industry are urging caution about AI’s rapid acceleration, pointing to labor market threats or more catastrophic risks. But in China, this chorus has been largely muted, until now.

China has the highest global share of people who say AI tools have more benefits than drawbacks, and they’ve shown an eagerness to embrace it. […] It’s hard to overstate the exuberance in the tech sector since the emergence of DeepSeek’s market-moving reasoning model earlier this year. Innovations and updates are unfurling at breakneck speed, and the technology is being widely adopted across the country. But not everyone’s on board.

Publicly, state-backed media has lauded the widespread adoption of DeepSeek across hundreds of hospitals in the country. But a group of medical researchers tied to Tsinghua University published a paper in the medical journal JAMA in late April gently questioning if this was happening “too fast, too soon.”

It argued that health-care institutions are facing pressure from “social media discourse” to implement DeepSeek in order to not appear “technologically backward.” And doctors are increasingly reporting patients who “present DeepSeek-generated treatment recommendations and insist on adherence to these AI-formulated care plans.” The team argued that as much as AI has shown potential to help in the medical field, this rushed rollout carries risks. They are right to be cautious.

But it’s not just the doctors who are raising doubts. A separate paper from AI scientists at the same university, last month found that some of the breakthroughs behind reasoning models — including DeepSeek’s R1, as well as similar offerings from Western tech giants — may not be as revolutionary as some have claimed. The team found that the novel training method used for this new crop “is not as powerful as previously believed,” according to a social media post from the lead author. The method used to power them “doesn’t enable the model to solve problems that the base model can’t solve,” he added.

This means the innovations underpinning what has been widely dubbed as the next step — toward achieving so-called Artificial General Intelligence — may not be as much of a leap as some had hoped. This research from Tsinghua holds extra weight: The institution is one of the pillars of the domestic AI scene, long churning out both keystone research and ambitious startup founders.

Another easily overlooked word of warning came from a speech given by Zhu Songchun, dean of the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, linked to Peking University. Zhu said that for the nation to remain competitive it needs more substantive research and less laudatory headlines, according to an in-depth English-language analysis of his remarks published by the independent China Media Project.

These cautious voices are a rare break from the broader narrative. But in a landscape where the deployment of AI has long been government priority, it makes them especially noteworthy. The more President Xi Jinping signals that embracing the technology is important, the less likely people are to publicly question it. This can lead to less overt forms of backlash, like social media hashtags on Weibo poking fun at chatbots’ errors. Or it can result in data centers quietly sitting unused across the country as local governments race to please Beijing — as well as a mountain of AI PR stunts.

This doesn’t mean that AI in China is just propaganda. The conflict extends far beyond its tech sector — US firms are also guilty of getting carried away promoting the technology. But multiple things can be true at once. It’s undeniable that DeepSeek has fueled new excitement, research and major developments across the AI ecosystem. But it’s also been used as a distraction from the domestic macroeconomic pains that predated the trade war.

Without guardrails, the risk of rushing out the technology is greater than just investors losing money — people’s health is at stake. From Hangzhou to Silicon Valley, the more we ignore the voices questioning the AI hype train, the more we blind ourselves to consequences of a potential derailment.

cross-posted from lemmy.sdf.org/post/36316494

Archived

Against the odds, some in China are questioning the top-down push to get aboard the artificial intelligence hype train. In a tightly controlled media environment where these experts can easily be drowned out, it’s important to listen to them.

Across the US and Europe, loud voices inside and outside the tech industry are urging caution about AI’s rapid acceleration, pointing to labor market threats or more catastrophic risks. But in China, this chorus has been largely muted, until now.

China has the highest global share of people who say AI tools have more benefits than drawbacks, and they’ve shown an eagerness to embrace it. […] It’s hard to overstate the exuberance in the tech sector since the emergence of DeepSeek’s market-moving reasoning model earlier this year. Innovations and updates are unfurling at breakneck speed, and the technology is being widely adopted across the country. But not everyone’s on board.

Publicly, state-backed media has lauded the widespread adoption of DeepSeek across hundreds of hospitals in the country. But a group of medical researchers tied to Tsinghua University published a paper in the medical journal JAMA in late April gently questioning if this was happening “too fast, too soon.”

It argued that health-care institutions are facing pressure from “social media discourse” to implement DeepSeek in order to not appear “technologically backward.” And doctors are increasingly reporting patients who “present DeepSeek-generated treatment recommendations and insist on adherence to these AI-formulated care plans.” The team argued that as much as AI has shown potential to help in the medical field, this rushed rollout carries risks. They are right to be cautious.

But it’s not just the doctors who are raising doubts. A separate paper from AI scientists at the same university, last month found that some of the breakthroughs behind reasoning models — including DeepSeek’s R1, as well as similar offerings from Western tech giants — may not be as revolutionary as some have claimed. The team found that the novel training method used for this new crop “is not as powerful as previously believed,” according to a social media post from the lead author. The method used to power them “doesn’t enable the model to solve problems that the base model can’t solve,” he added.

This means the innovations underpinning what has been widely dubbed as the next step — toward achieving so-called Artificial General Intelligence — may not be as much of a leap as some had hoped. This research from Tsinghua holds extra weight: The institution is one of the pillars of the domestic AI scene, long churning out both keystone research and ambitious startup founders.

Another easily overlooked word of warning came from a speech given by Zhu Songchun, dean of the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, linked to Peking University. Zhu said that for the nation to remain competitive it needs more substantive research and less laudatory headlines, according to an in-depth English-language analysis of his remarks published by the independent China Media Project.

These cautious voices are a rare break from the broader narrative. But in a landscape where the deployment of AI has long been government priority, it makes them especially noteworthy. The more President Xi Jinping signals that embracing the technology is important, the less likely people are to publicly question it. This can lead to less overt forms of backlash, like social media hashtags on Weibo poking fun at chatbots’ errors. Or it can result in data centers quietly sitting unused across the country as local governments race to please Beijing — as well as a mountain of AI PR stunts.

This doesn’t mean that AI in China is just propaganda. The conflict extends far beyond its tech sector — US firms are also guilty of getting carried away promoting the technology. But multiple things can be true at once. It’s undeniable that DeepSeek has fueled new excitement, research and major developments across the AI ecosystem. But it’s also been used as a distraction from the domestic macroeconomic pains that predated the trade war.

Without guardrails, the risk of rushing out the technology is greater than just investors losing money — people’s health is at stake. From Hangzhou to Silicon Valley, the more we ignore the voices questioning the AI hype train, the more we blind ourselves to consequences of a potential derailment.