Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

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I think that this isn’t really getting the right attention, about what a massive WTF situation this is…
its a 384 bit certificate and this is the private key
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
00:00:04
that is just fucking NUTS
Phew to think how close it is to my private key
that’s a very long way to spell the random number 4
::4
That kind of removes the bit size and hides it in assumption.
And 8 of them no less. The guess of this being test code leaking into prod is likely, but security focused companies need consequences for stuff like this. That being said:
Looks like consequences to me…
It’s like winning the lottery
Winning the lottery is (ballpark) 1 in 10^9, so generating a key below a million is like winning 11 lotteries in a row, while buying 1 ticket in each.
They wouldn’t know how you’d done it, but I think you’d be arrested, with valid probable cause.
is much more secure.
LOL, People are never gonna give this up.
I’m too lazy to do the math. Does that translate to the URL?
No, it is a string of text. “Never gonna give you up never gonna let you down”
[deleted]
ROFL, People are never gonna let this down.
I mean, yes, it’s entirely possible and within the realm of probability of getting that as a key. But realistically it’s very, very, fucking unlikely.
Ye, I’d struggle to believe ONE key getting generated like that, but 8 points to pure incompetence
Isn’t every key equally unlikely?
Yes, be in is why having 8 of them total in the 2 digit range (I.e only using up to 6 bits of 384-bits) just screams incompetence of a hand generated key.
Okay, that’s fun and scary at the same time.
The article links to a webpage,
emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
That shows if your browser is still using those certs, and though it says Firefox has already updated, maybe it hasn’t reached mobile yet as it shows I’m using them all still.
I guess I won’t connect to anything important for a few days.
My Firefox mobile got green ✅
Maybe try manually updating through the app store
In app safari on Mlem got all greens.
What’s odd is that I have auto updates disabled for Firefox on my spare phone, and I still show green on everything. I don’t think it’s updated in a couple months now.
Firefox can push certificate revocation updates without having to push a new browser build
…mozilla.org/…/crlite-fast-private-and-comprehens…
I think cert updates happen automatically on their own without the browser needing to be updated.
what version are you on?
That one is on version 154.0, dated August.
Mine showed red, but after updating it now shows all green
Useful link, thanks.
Mobile Waterfox passes.
is the post body having issues displaying? asking because this is way past the first time this season i’ve seen people not see it
It’s displaying fine for me, I think I was just scrolling quickly on my phone and didn’t notice that the https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com link in the body was different from the linked article. I saw a blockquote in the post body, and figured that the URL beneath the quote was a link to the article.
Interesting. I’m also using Waterfox and getting all red on my end.
Huh. I have version 1.2.8.1.
1.2.9 for me. Seems like I might have to revert to the older one.
I'm using Firefox and that site says I'm good.
Yep, my Firefox mobile hasn’t updated yet either, gonna see if there’s an update I can grab.
Uhh… Weird. In my phone (Android 15) both Firefox 158.0.1 and Brave 1.97.59 (Chromium 155.0.8059.85) connect to 6 of the 12 hosts.
But on my tablet (Android 10) I have the same versions of Firefox and Brave, and there they don’t connect to any of the hosts.
What can I do?
Odd my mobile Brave rejects all.
For mobile
My Vanadium just refused all 12 connections. But maybe some of the DNS blocking or Suricata on my LAN might have helped.
Thanks, I tried harder and got the same result as you. Edited my comment above to reflect.
I just recently swapped to Fennec and it’s correctly getting 0/12. These updates seem a bit inconsistent.
I’m on a 10/7 build and I’m vulnerable on mobile FireFox, as well.
Edit: updated to a 10/19 version, 158.0.1, and it’s still vulnerable.
Ironfox is all green for me.
Cromite is half red, half green.
So yeah, fuck Chromium’s monopoly.
Are you using a vpn/tor?
WDYM you’re still using them all?
You don’t have e any green ticks?
Do you mean not connecting to anything? Because that would be the action if you considered this a threat
That’s… what I said?
I do consider this a threat. A root certificate being compromised is a big deal. Your web traffic goes across multiple devices before reaching its intended destination, and if any one of them are compromised they could successfully perform an invisible man in the middle attack of your browser/app keeps trusting those certificates.
Ssl is pretty useful, yeah, but those that were mass unlocked with a gimmick key were already very insecure and at this moment they are revoked. Either way, aren’t you supposed to be locked in now?
That only applies to applications and services that support remote certificate revocation.
Those certificates were still in use until Firefox offered another update this morning, but that’s just the browser. Every company and their little bastard love child wants you to use an app to connect to their services, how many of those apps support automatic certificate revocation?
Any app on your phone that doesn’t is now vulnerable to being compromised invisibly. A successful MITM attack looks like nothing at all. The attacker decrypts the traffic with the compromised certificate’s secret to snoop in on the secrets (like username and password) and re-encrypts it to send it forward so the destination server doesn’t know any different either.
Now that it’s public knowledge, I guarantee someone is trying to capitalize on it right now.
How certain are you that not a single switch between you and your bank’s website is fully secured?
I’m getting “⚠️ Inconclusive (timed out)” on Firefox 👀
Update mobile Firefox it should be fixed now
Brave Mobile is green ✅
LOL
Edge on windows 11 also did it. At least as of last night. My debian boxes are up to date and they have been fixed.
Newest release of Firefox Nightly on Android also still seems to connect.
I updated my Firefox today in the afternoon and afterwards it didn’t connect.
I did try with Fennec from F-Droid, which was fine. I updated Nightly just now, and it does still connect.
Edit: Firefox Beta connects to 6/12 on emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
Edit 2: Regular Firefox connects to 0/12
Edit 3: Latest update fixed this in nightly, I haven’t checked beta.
[deleted]
Thankfully someone did pull their finger out and get it done an hour later, thankfully Windows also moved to a live CRL requiring no reboots and it’s only hundreds of thousand of unpatched Linux boxes that remain affected 😓
my Ubuntu 24.04 server is secured despite not updating anything or rebooting (I have now, but curl was already declining it before)
other issues would be software not respecting the system level certs, but that can happen on any OS, it just depends on the program
Uhhhh as a dumb dumb Ubuntu user, do I need to do anything other than update?
Updating is all 😊 just need to make sure you have the latest CA-certificates package
Many thanks friend 😊
That’s amazing! I have the same combination on my luggage.
I used to too.
Lottery!!
You’ve Skroobed up
Sarcasm: Did you have the same lock for your underwear too pwr chance? Mine have sprouted legs.
So, all governments?
I’m confused, doesn’t a VPN help protect against mitm in public networks? Are you saying that governments might use this at VPN exit nodes? That actually makes sense
For VPNs to be vulnerable, the VPN provider’s internal traffic must flow through an MITM server before exiting the VPN provider’s internal network. VPN providers don’t have any specific weakness or flaw that would would make an MITM attack easier to execute, but it is definitely true that a VPN provider would be a high-value target for such an attacker, both because a large volume of traffic flows through the VPN provider, and also because people who use a VPN provider are more likely to be doing so because they are doing things that their government wouldn’t approve of.
Good thing my private keys are under a rock by my front door
I hear crypto bros swear by birdbaths xd
(I read this post 2 years ago and the "Repeat this process six more times with my six other bird baths" stuck with me xD)
…privacyredirect.com/…/a_brief_glimpse_into_the_a…
thanks :) need to bookmark some of these mirrors
I use untrackme on mobile, but I don’t have anything of the sort on the desktop.
So if my understanding is correct, to be exploited the attacker would already need to be in a position to intercept your traffic, but this means when they do they can effectively impersonate anyone.
This could actually be an interesting attack vector for hacking IOT devices. If you control the DNS server the device connects to you can get it to trust literally anything.
MITM HTTPS traffic without a key doesn't really let you do much of anything, especially with stuff like HSTS. You can mess with DNS, but the whole certificate authority thing is meant to make it so you can't redirect someone's traffic to a malicious server.
This leaked private key completely destroys that guarantee, making it extremely scary.
Plus, saved traffic for any site signed by this key which didn't use PFS will be subject to post-facto decryption.edit: I don't know wtf I was thinking, the decryption thing is nonsense.
I don't think so about the post-facto decrypt. Keyexchange runs with the certs of the destination server. The cerst affected by the leak are intermediate certs which give trust to a cert chain AFAIK.
You're absolutely right, I had shit all mixed up in my head. Oops 😅 thank you for the correction.
Wasn’t the Gamer’s Nexus video on LG spy TVs, saying that the telemetry traffic is protected by SSL and thus they couldn’t figure out exactly what was sent? Would they be able to use the leaked keys to decrypt the traffic?
That should be possible yes, depending on how those TVs handle their cert stores.
wait how would that work? don’t LG TVs use a random CA that likely isn’t eMurdha?
Most systems trust a number of “root” CAs, including the one that signed the eMudhra certificate. It’s possible LG TVs look specifically for a trusted LG certificate, but it’s also very possible they use the same certificate stores as most major OSes/browsers.
Thanks, I wasn’t sure if it mattered that the leaked keys in this case were for intermediate certs and not root certs (afaik)
This news is scary and bad, but if the root keys ever leak, the Internet as we know it is fucked.
Yup.
These days, a lot of firmware blobs are also signed with the vendor’s key, so you’d still need to get past that hurdle.
Adversary-in-the-middle = man-in-the-middle?
Yes, it’s the same as mitm. I get that it’s to avoid gendering the term but it doesn’t really roll off the tongue or preserve the existing abbreviation. I’ve heard the alternatives: machine in the middle, mallory in the middle or, my favourite, Malcolm in the middle.
Less syllables is always gonna win, especially when it comes with alliteration
Just like main replaced master in a heartbeat.
Ticketmaster remains a notable holdout in that respect.
Menace in the middle
Molestor in the middle
Man is a gender neutral term
Only in some obsolete or deprecated contexts.
Everyone says mankind.
Monster in the middle is my fave
perp-in-the-path
First time I’ve come across the phrase but it sounds like the same thing. It’s gender neutral though I guess. Maybe that’s it?
It’s commonly used and you often see the abbreviation AITM these days. You’re right about the reason.
Good to know. Cheers.
We had one compulsory course in English at university. The professor corrected a “man-in-the-middle” I had in a field-specific paper. She preferred “middle man”. She did buy that it was an established term in cryptography, though.
It’s a term for the attack, yes but not for the attacker
Lmao
This plus the php thing and everything I was planning on doing today is out the window 😖
Why, what were you planning on doing that depended on these things?
I was planning on doing other work beside patching servers today.
Oh I get it, duh 😄
What’s the PHP thing?
this thehackernews.com/…/php2shell-two-unpatched-criti…
On grapheneOS, i just manually disabled the root CA’s in the trusted root store.
These are all android versions on graphene:
*There are now 14 certs
AFFECTED:
Firefox (nightly) ,Ironfox, and fennec STILL connects to all 12
Tor connects to 6 of them
Cromite is still affected by 6 of them.
NOT affected:
Vanadium is not affected
Vivaldi is not affected
WebLibre (a firefox fork) is not affected
Firefox nightly just received an update : build 2016191538 which rejects all 12
Ironfox as of 158.0.1 (Build #2016191578) is no longer affected.
Tor is fixed as of 15.0.26 (140.17.0esr) (Build #2016191530) Fennec all clear
My IronFox is clear as per emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
Same here
Fennec f-droid didn’t connect to any on my test.
Tor is compromised? How do I check if my firefox or chrome has been compromised now?
I thought tor was impossible to decrypt for an attacker, but they can see you are using it.
It isn’t that tor is compromised, it’s the tls root CA, which can be used to create certs to look like valid site cert for any site.
Which basically means the internet is compromised until these (and God knows which other root authorities) are blocked and decertified.
Nice, that’s handy
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I’ve done this as well, but Fennec doesn’t seem to care at all, and still happily connects, even after cache clears and a reboot. Fennec also ignored the about:config change another commenter suggested. Makes no sense. It’s pissing me off.
Yep. Got updates from firefox, ironfox, fennec within past few.hours.
Firefox and ironfox have resolved issue.
Fennec still conmects to all 12
Oof. Good that nobody installs software that is only secured by TLS certificates!
I don’t even know what TLS certificates are.
Okay, the other comment was actually pretty funny. But this one’s a serious answer.
Transport Layer Security protocol is a way to share secrets. Basically, it’s the lock on your airport luggage. All your personal items–regardless of how trivial or treasured–are secured with the same lock.
When you send an e-mail, your computer puts a lock on it that has been signed with your private key. It’s sent to a recipient, who can unlock it with their own key. There’s a complicated exchange of keys and ciphers called a ‘handshake’ that happens when a website is loaded on your computer, or an e-mail is received. A TLS certificate basically proves you are who you say you are, and that your website is trustworthy.
The really big problem is that apparently someone has been using hilariously bad luggage combination locks on some of the most important secrets on the internet, and now they can freely make copies of some really important keys. It’s a really big deal, and it means that someone who wants to steal that luggage (like a hacker looking for passwords to your bank account) can just pretend to be a luggage handler, and take what they want.
* Communications, which could be you logging in into your banking account. The attacker would be able to see your banking password, for example. Or it could replace a software update your laptop is receiving with malware. A manipulated WLAN router in a cafe or an airport could do that.
This was the ELI5 version, and admittedly, network security isn’t my strong suit. Thank you for the correction.
What other certificates should I check that the software be secured by before installing it?
Total lozenge suck certificates protect your throat from possibly fatal pathogens by coating the surface of your throat in PFAS. Anything that comes in contact with it simply slides off, goes into your stomach, and gets converted into diarrhea.
Is this the OG poem for your sprig?
Omg!!
Definitely not. This one doesn’t do poetry
That comment above is poetry.
Who?
Sprog.
Who’s sprog?
Lol this guy doesn’t know sprog.
What a noob
Who tf is sprog?
It was a username on another site, a while ago. They wrote in poems. Nice stuff.
Someone has commandeered their name here on the fediverse; or so it seems.
SSL has had a broken trust model for decades. We need something truly decentralized and auditable.
Ok, but what would that look like in a way that would have mitigated this situation? Seems likely that such a system could actually exacerbate this specific scenario.
SSL tries to solve several problems at once (identity verification + encryption of connection) over a protocol (TCP/IP) that isn’t cryptographically tied together. Some very dedicated, smart people have sketched out some ideas on this. Basically, this compromise only happened because we’re relying on a chain of third parties and intermediaries to do this verification of certs.
Web of trust, blockchain-based system (where a name like ebay.com can be registered and publish their own cert, so you can prove whoever owns ebay.com also owns that cert), a TCP/IP replacement that you can derive a key from (there are several interesting proposals here, some of which run on top of IP), are all ways of solving this problem with different tradeoffs.
This biggest problem like with any protocol change is inertia behind SSL. Same reason a number of excellent anti-spam protocol enhancements never made it to be widely accepted in SMTP and now everybody is fleeing to other methods of communicating without SMTPs issues.
Something like DANE, maybe? Only the websites actually using the compromised certificates would be compromised.
Conceptually, I get it. Esepecially if you go with the ‘DNS pinning of CA’ to have a ‘belt and suspenders’ approach where two chains of authority must be broken, one of which inherently tied to your name.
Practically speaking, DNSSEC hasn’t managed to get ubiquitous adoption. To the point where browsers started giving up and doing DNS over HTTPS to well known providers instead.
www.gnunet.org
note: I understand none if this
After trying for a bit, I can certainly relate to understanding little of it. It’s not as concretely explained as I would like and sticks to abstract principles. So no idea about the current state of affairs.
This is TLS, not SSL.
Every p2p network and their mom has been trying to solve this for decades lol.
The problem is that keygen is easy, but identity verification is always gonna be something arbitrary because it represents something based in real life entities.
Even with TLS, people only trust google.com as being Google because they learned that Google uses google.com.
I could make a goggle.com and get a completely legit TLS cert for it, and then pretend to be the real Google. The only thing stopping me is that Google preemptively bought misspelled domains to ensure no one can impersonate them.
The lazy solution already exists. Just don’t use PKI and use direct trust on first connect like SSH.
tween that and PHP CVE, everyone is on fire ATM
Can I use this to MITM the connection of a proprietary Android app that only runs on a device with Google Play Protect (a form of remote attestation)? And then reverse engineer the API?
Assuming that the device hasn’t been updated yet, yeah, this is what it allows you to do.
If you connect your device to a ‘fake’ router that’s completely under your control, then when the device attempts to connect to its remote server, you pretend to be it, and provide a certificate signed by this ‘trusted’ authority. Device will accept it. Make another connection to the real remote server. Decrypt what the device sends you, and send it on to the remote server; it’ll believe that you’re the android device, and respond with a message that you can decrypt, store, reencrypt with your fake key, and send it to the device. Repeat.
You’ll only be able to impersonate the API until the keys are revoked by an update. That’s maybe not so useful. However, any other connection that can be MITM’d and include other personal information - your bank card details, say - can be read, too.
So this means, i shouldn’t use my old android anymore?
With my ‘security hat’ on, I’d have to say you shouldn’t use anything that’s no longer receiving updates. But that would create a lot of e-waste for no reason.
To see if your phone’s browser is still receiving updates, you can browse to:
emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
That has a grid showing whether your browser was willing to connect to sites using the compromised keys. If your browser is using its own cert style and still receiving updates, should be all green ticks. If so, then you can still use the phone for browsing internet. Be aware that using other apps on your phone (like eg. your email app) could be read easily by third parties, especially if you’re connected to unfamiliar wifi.
If it’s all red, maybe try another browser? Or relegate that device to being a dumb phone - switch off its data connection, phone calls only.
Depends. If the app uses cert pinning it will only trust the cert baked into it.
Fennec and other Firefox forks: Put
about:configin address bar and search for
security.enterprise_roots.enabledToggle it to True
If your android cert store is good, you will be good for now. Test it
arrgh. got to get off my lazy ass and do a thorough updating this weekend.
Why would this put vpn users at risk if browsers have already blocked the problematic certs?
it would put VPN users at risk if browsers had not blocked it or updated enough and the VPN provider chooses to do shenanigans, that’s why security patches patch the security and why it it’s important to patch this security issue
What, just because they are potential middle men?
yes, the VPN providers
VPN users use certificates to identify their servers. I assume then it’s not used by the VPN services?
⬆️ happy being on holidays
Waterfox on android is in the clear
Edit: Build info, just in case
1.2.8.1 (Build #2026380629)
GV: 156.0-20260922074625
AS: 156.0
OS: Android 16
IronFox all green here
Regular Firefox, too
Those were NSA backdoors.
The wildest part to me is that the keys weren’t just weak, they were tiny — 4, 56, 66 — small enough to fit in a byte. That’s not degraded entropy, that’s a keygen path that returned a counter or a placeholder value instead of randomness at all. And since the public halves of those certs have been sitting in Certificate Transparency logs for years, anyone could’ve caught it by just testing small scalars against the published public keys — no nation-state budget needed to find them, only to quietly use them. The browser response was genuinely fast once it surfaced, but this was detectable the whole time. Makes you wonder how many other CAs have test values live in production that nobody’s ever bothered to scan for.
is AI karma-farming on Lemmy too now?